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PREFACE
Jan Christian Smuts of South Africa was one of
the most remarkable and interesting personalities of the
past century*

Although he came from a small, and in some

ways, backward country, his influence spread throughout
much of the world.

In his lifetime of eighty years, 1370-

1950, he had several careers.

Although his profession

was the law, he was also, at various times, a soldier, a
statesman, a diplomat, a scientist, and a philosopher.
He served as a general officer in three wars and helped
to found two world, peace organizations:

the League of

Nations and the United Nations,
Many aspects of Smuts1s life and work are worthy
of detailed study, but his role at the 1919 Paris Peace
Conference was chosen for this paper for several reasons.
First, the Peace Conference has been extensively examined
from almost every angle, but no one has written specifi
cally of Smuts1s role at the Conference.

Second, this one

episode in his life is a reasonably compact unit which can
be fully treated in a work of this length, and yet it
serves well to Illustrate the kind of man Smuts was and
his impact on world events.
This work would never have been attempted,., much
less completed, without the constant help and encourage
ment of Professor A. Stanley Trickett, Chairman of the

iii
Department of History at the University of Omaha.

I

hereby express my gratitude for his encouragement not only
In the preparation of this thesis but also throughout my
graduate and undergraduate years at the University of
Omaha *
NAOMI HOWERTON CORYELL
Omaha, Nebraska
March, k, 1 9 6 3
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CHAPTER I
JAN CHRISTIAN SMUTS
Jan Christian-*- Smuts Yras born a British, subject,
in 1870, in Cape Colony, South Africa, where his ancestors,
who Y^ere predominantly Dutch, had lived since before 1 6 9 2 .
As a second son he received no formal education until the
death of his elder brother in 1332 made him the heir of
the family 1 s hopes.

He then entered his first school and

completed its eleven year course In four years.

His mother

had previously taught him at least the rudiments of reading
and writing the English

language.2

At the age of sixteen

Smuts went on to Victoria College In Stellenbosch, Cape
Colony, where he spent five of the happiest years of his
life.
Krige.

He there met and fell In love with Sybella Margaretha
She was to be the only love of his life, although

he was not able to marry her until 1397•

Their marriage

W. Keith Hancock, Smuts; The Sanguine Years,
1370-1919 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1 9 6 2 ),
p. 3s note, said that Smuts1s second name was spelled
Christiaan In the baptismal register. Smuts1s son said
that he always spelled it Christian, the same as his mater
nal grandfather, Jan Christian de Vries, for whom he was
named. Jan Christian Smuts, Jan Christian Smuts (New York:
William Morrow & Company, 195271 P~* 39 This author will be
cited hereafter as Smuts, Jr. Smuts always signed his name
merely J. C. Smuts. Rene Kraus, Old Master: The Life of
Jan Christian Smuts (New York: e 3 p 9 Dutton & Co., 19^7)*

p . 10.
2

Hlancock, op. cit., pp. 3-11; Smuts, Jr., op. c it . ,
pp. 12-13.

2
proved to be a very successful and happy one, producing
nine children, six of whom survived infancy.

He took his

degree in 1 8 9 1 in science and literature, winning honors
in both.

His high scholastic standing won him a scholar

ship for overseas study; he used it to study law at
Cambridge.3
Smuts1s record at Cambridge was brilliant.

He did

both parts of the Law Tripos simultaneously and gained
distinction in both--a feat unique in the history of the
University.

While in England he also found time to write

a lengthy treatise called T,Walt Whitman--A Study in the
Evolution of Personality.n

This essay, which he unsuccess

fully attempted to have published, set forth the beginnings
of a system of philosophy, which he later called t!Holism!T
and expressed more fully in his book Holism and Evolution.^
Upon his return to South Africa in 1 8 9 ?* Smuts set
himself up to practice law in Capetown.

He also became

interested in politics, his first political action being a
speech in support of Cecil Rhodes, who was then Premier of
Cape Colony.

To Smuts at that time Rhodes appeared as a

great idealist.

In fact RhodesTs vision of a great united

British Africa was one which Smuts never repudiated as h e •

^Hancock, op. cit., pp. 15-32: Smuts, Jr., op. cit.,
p p . llf-lS.
^Ibid., pp. 18-20; Hancock, op. cit., pp. 33-51*

3
later did Rhodes himself*-^

The Jameson Raid of December

29, 1395 9 turned Smuts against Rhodes and even for a time
against all the British in South Africa.

He left Capetown

and moved to the Transvaal and to the support of Paul
Kruger, the patriarchal president of that small Boer
republic.^
In 1 8 9 8 , Kruger appointed Srauts to the post of
state attorney.

In that capacity he worked with Kruger

for the next year and a half to avoid a war with the
British.

Their efforts were unsuccessful, Smuts believed,

because Sir Alfred Milner, the British High Commissioner,
was determined to Incorporate the Transvaal as well as the
Orange Free State Into the British Empire even if It took
a war to do It.

Although the two men later became friends

and worked together In the Interests of the British Empire,
Smuts never changed his opinion of Milner’s role in South
Africa.*^
When war broke out late in 1 8 9 9 * Smuts remained
at his political post until the fall of Pretoria, In the
summer of 1 9 0 0 , ended the more formal phase of the

war.8

5smuts, Jr., op. cit., pp. 21-25; Hancock, o p . cit.
PP. 55-58.
Ibid., pp. 58-62; Smuts, Jr., op. cit., pp. 27-28.
The word Boer, which means farmer, refers to the Inhabitant
of South Africa of Dutch or Huguenot descent.
'Ibid., pp. 32-39O
Ibid. , pp. Ll2—5^4-•

IjThe Boers, however, did not surrender.

They began a long

period of guerilla, warfare which failed to preserve their
independence, but which preserved their honor and selfrespect and provided a mass of heroic legends to be passed
on to their children.

Smuts, too, became a commando leader.

He led an extensive raid into Gape Colony and harried the
British unmercifully for over a year.

Smuts*s successful

exploit, his first excursion into the more active pursuits
of life, developed him both physically and intellectually.
He was now ready to ushoulder untold responsibilities.

He

had left his youth behind.tf9
Smuts was present when peace was made between the
British and the Boers at Vereeniging in May 1902.

The two

small republics lost their independence, but Smuts found a
new vision in the midst of defeat.

Lord Kitchener, the

British military commander, told Smuts, in a private talk,
that the Liberals were likely to come to power in Britain
in the near future and that they would in all probability
grant a constitution to South Africa.

This talk erased the

majority of Smuts*s anti-British feelings and won him over
to the British terms of peace.

"Thus with a few simple

words Kitchener had sown a seed of Empire in the heart of
Q

Kraus, op. cit., p. 3.10. See also Smuts, Jr.,
on. cit., pp. 55-72, 7^; Hancock, op. cit., pp. 133-L5.

5
Smuts, with, what resiilts the world knows.113-0
Kitchener*s prophecy proved correct; the Liberals
took office in 1905-

Smuts then went on a "private” visit

to England to see what he could make of the half-promise
he had recieved at Vereeniging.

The climax of his visit

Y/as his talk with Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman.

Such were

Smuts*s persuasive powers that he induced the new Prime
Minister, who in turn persuaded the Cabinet, to give the
former Boer republics self-government within the Empire.
"The feeling for the English that swept into him when
Campbell-Bannerman so trusted the Boers in 190 6 has been the
strongest influence in Smuts* life.

Smuts himself said,

"*They gave us back in everything but name, our country.
After four years.

Has such a miracle of trust and magnanimity

ever happened before?
it.

Only people like the English could do
7^
They may make mistakes, but they are a big people. *11
In the new government of the Transvaal, Smuts be

came both Colonial Secretary and Minister of Education.
His closest friend, General Louis Botha, became Prime Minis
ter.

Smuts worked very hard during this period, "running

*^F. S. Crafford, Jan Smuts (Garden City, Hew York:
Doubleday, Doran & Co., 191401 PP• 53-5^-« See also Smuts, Jr.,
op. cit., pp. 75-76; Kraus, op. cit., pp. 118-19; Hancock,
op. cit., p. l5§; Sarah Gertrude Millin, General Smuts
(2 vols.; Boston: Little, Brown, and Company^ 193671 1* 1 6 9 .
11Ibid ., I, 197-991 PSmuts, Jr., op. cit., p. 91*

6

not only his own portfolios "but those of most of the other
members of the Cabinet as well, since many of the ministers
were as yet inexperienced in the tasks of government.
Meanwhile, a movement for a closer union of the
four colonies in South Africa developed, and Smuts took s.
leading part in the movement.^

Representatives of the

four colonies met in a National Convention in 1908.
headed the delegation from the Transvaal.

Smuts

Long before the

Convention convened, however, Smuts had been developing
his own ideas for a constitution for all South Africa.

He

was the only delegate \iho had a definite plan on paper,
complete to the last detail, when he arrived at the con
vention.^

Because of his advance preparation, his large

and able staff, and his own energy and drive, Smuts was
able to exert a tremendous influence.

The final Act of

Union followed his ideas very closely.^

Smuts always re

garded his work at the National Convention as the greatest
single contribution he made to his homeland.^

In the new

Union government Smuts held three portfolios from 1910-1912,

-^Smuts, Jr., op. cit., p. 9^*
"^L. M. Thompson, The Unification of South Africa,
1902-1910 (Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, i9 6 0 ) , pp7 70-7^1 Ibid., pp. l52-6k.

l6

Ibid., passim; Smuts, Jr., op. cit., pp. 97-103*

17rbid., p.

7
those of Mines, Interior, and Defence; and two portfolios,
those of Defence and Finance, from 1912-1919*^
When the World War broke out In 191^-* there was no
doubt in Smuts's mind where South Africa's duty lay; she
would support the Empire against Germany.

Prime Minister

Botha agreed with his friend and told the British govern
ment that it could withdraw its troops; South Africa would
be responsible for her own security.
troops left at once.

Seven thousand British

At the same time, the British govern

ment requested that South Africa send troops to invade
German South West Africa in order to capture its two wire
less stations.

When the South African ministers took steps

to comply with this request, It became apparent that not
all South Africans agreed with Smuts and Botha.

Many had.

never reconciled themselves to their defeat by the British.
They looked upon the war as their opportunity to reverse
the decision of 1902.

Many hated Smuts and Botha for what

was considered their treacherous cooperation with Britain.
These malcontents rose In rebellion, and their leaders pre
pared to join forces with the Germans In South West Africa.
For a time Botha and Smuts showed infinite patience with the
rebels.

They warned; they begged; they appealed.

Neither

wished to move against their former comrades-in-arms.

When

It became evident that no appeals would dissuade the rebels,

■^Smuts, Jr., op. cit., p. Ll73*

8

General Botha himself took the field against them, using
loyal Boer troops as much as possible.

The rebellion was

put dovm rather easily, but it engendered much bitterness
which has not yet fully

a b a t e d .

-**9

After the rebellion had been overcome, Botha and
Smuts moved against German South West Africa.

Their con

quest of this sparsely-populated, almost-desert area,
nexeciited with clockwork precision, was the first Allied
success in the First World W a r . " ^
Early in 1 9 1 6 , Smuts was offered a larger field
in which to exercise his military talents.

He was given

the command of the campaign In East Africa with the rank
of lieutenant general in the British army, thus becoming
Britain's second youngest general.

21

In this campaign

Smuts 11showed himself a brilliantly efficient, resourceful
and energetic Commander-In-Chief. 1122

In less than a year,

he had almost cleared the Germans from East Africa, but
they then turned his own Boer-war
against him.

game of guerilla, warfare

In fact, some German bands were still roaming

19'Smuts, Jr., pip, cit., pp. 121-33; Hancock,
op. cit., pp. 377-9^20

Kraus, op. cit., p. 2k2.
op. cit., pp. 3 9 ^-qOO•
21

See also Hancock,

1.
Smuts, Jr., op. cit., p. lqo.

22David Lloyd George, War Memoirs of David hloyd
George ( 6 vols.; Boston: LittTe^~T3rown Zz Co., 1933-37)*
IV, 91. Cited hereafter as War Memoirs.

9
East Africa when the Treaty of Versailles was signed,
In January 1917 » Smuts was recalled to South Africa
and from there sent to England to attend the first Imperial
’Jar Conference a 3 a deputy for Prime Minister Botha, who
felt he could not leave his post at that time.^*

Smuts

was not to return to South Africa until after the war was
over and the treaty with Germany signed.

To England Smuts

brought
. , . an atmosphere of other-worldly calm. He was
unhurried, unapprehensive, reflective and serene.
In a moment which seemed to many in England the darkest
in her history he spoke cheerfully and optimistically
of the power of the British Empire, which in a happy
Inspiration he rechristened the British Commonwealth
of Nations. . . .
He insisted that the war was a war of ideals and
that It must be fought until It ended in a victory
of the spirit. And the nation . • . cheered the
speaker with something of the religious enthusiasm
with which over a year later Europe was to greet the
oracular pronouncements of President Wilson.
Smuts not only attended the Imperial Conference but
was also Included in the Imperial War Cabinet which met at
the same time.

The latter body was composed of the British

Cabinet with representatives of the Dominions and India
added.

David Lloyd George, the British Prime Minister,
P1
2h

Kraus, op. cit., p. 25&«

'"Smuts, Jr., op. cit., p. l63.
25George Slocombe, A Mirror to Geneva (Hew York:
Henry Holt and Company, 19 3&)'» PP* 77-73. See also Jan
Christian Smuts, War-Time Speeches (Hew York: George PI.
Doran Company, 1917);Jan Christian Smuts, Toward a Better
World (Hew York: World Book Company, 19WpT7 p.' 23'.

10

was immediately impressed by Smuts*s character and ability.
He wrote:
Smuts is one of the most remarkable personalities
of his time. He is that fine blend of intellect and
Human sympathy which constitutes the understanding
man. . . . H i s rare gifts of mind, and heart strength
ened those finer elements which are apt to be over
whelmed in an hour of savage temper and pitiless
carnage* Of his practical contribution to our coun
sels during these trying years, it is difficult to speak
too h i ghly.^
Sir Robert Borden, the Prime Minister of Canada, who himself
played a very vital role at the Imperial Conferences and
later at the Peace Conference, met Smuts for the first time
in Lond.on in 1917*
friendship.

The two men developed an intimate

Borden recorded that the "wonderful intellec

tual powers, x’/ide vision and astonishing career" of Smuts
"gave him a commanding place in our deliberations."^
Smuts did not return home at the conclusion of the
Imperial Conference.

Lloyd George explained why:

So deep was the impression that General Smuts
made at this time upon his colleagues, nay, upon
the nation, that w© would not let him leave lis when
the Conference was ended. We insisted on keeping
him here to help us at the centre with our war
efforts. In every aspect of our multifarious tasks
he was a valuable helper. He took his full share
of the numerous committees set up to investigate,
to advise, and subject to Cabinet assent, to direct
action on vital Issues of policy and strategy. He

^ L l o y d George, War Memoirs, IV, 17.
27 Robert Laird Borden, Robert Laird Borden: Kis
Memoirs, ed. Henry Borden (2 vols,; Hew York: The Mac
millan Company, 1933)* H * 6 6 7 .

became and remained until the end or the War, an ac
tive member of the British Cabinet for all the pur
poses of war direction.
During the last year and a half of the war, Smuts carried
out a number of diplomatic and organizational assignments
for the War Cabinet.

He assisted Lloyd George at an Inter-

Allied Conference in Paris in June 1917; he surveyed the
war front in 1913 and brought back a report on the condi
tion of affairs there; and, after the Caporetto disaster,
he accompanied Lloyd George to Italy to meet with the
Italian Premier.

One of Smuts1s most noted services was

the organizing and setting up of an effective Air Ministry
for Britain . ^
Prior to the 1919 P©a©© Conference, Smuts had be
come a world-renowned, figure, honored for his roles in
both peace and war.
three continents.

He attracted attention and comment on
A noted American professor wrote In the

Atlantic Monthly that Smuts was "one of the ablest paiblic
men of our day. . . . Liberty and Freedom are words
have not lost their savor for him. . . .

'-that

He is, above all,

a philosopher and has learned to unify philosophy and

28

Lloyd George, War Memoirs, IV, 3 6 . An InterestIn
record of the work of the Imperial War Conferences and
Cabinets of 1917 and 1913 from the point of view of a
Dominion Prime Minister Is contained in Borden, on. cit.,
II, 66L-9&, 8 0 6 -J4.5 .
^ L l o y d George, War Memoirs, IV, 91-93* lIf-7^
9*
[1 8 9 , 118-21l. See also Crafford, on. cit., pp. 130-32.

12
e x p e r i e n c e

.”30

When Colonel House was in England in 1917

as a personal emissary for President Wilson, he recorded
in his diary for November 13:
Nearly everyone I have met has asked me to be certain
to see Smuts. He has grown to be the lion of the hour.
• . . My expectations were unusually high; it was not
alone what I had heard of him, but I have been impressed
by his speeches and statements which I have read from
time to time. . . . I have confidence in his opinion.
He is one of the few men I have met in the Government
who do not seem tired. He is alert, energetic, and
forceful* 31
At the Peace Conference many, especially among the
British and American delegations, recorded favorable im
pressions of Smuts.

Bernard Baruch wrote:

Smuts represented the kind of reasoned idealism
upon which Wilson hoped to build the postwar world.
In his effort to be fair to Germany, and In his sup
port of a League of Nations, Smuts spoke for the
most liberal and enlightened sentiment at the Con
ference .3 2
Winston Churchill recorded that Lloyd George felt he could
turn to General Smuts when h© needed an riexponent of the
Liberal creed In International affairs” and that Smuts could
meet Wilson Ilon his own ground and speak his language to
OQ

Wallace Notestein, ”jan Smuts,” At1antic Monthly,
CXXII (July, 1913), 111-12.
31 Charles Seymour, The Intimate Papers of Colonel
House (Ip vols.; Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1923)',
III, 229-30.
B e r n a r d II. Baruch, Baruch: The Public Years
(New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, i9 6 0 ), p n . Tolp-lOp.
Cited hereafter as Public Years.

Wilson’s surprise and gratification,”^3

Colonel House

wrote that some men at Paris "towered above their fellows,
and these became centres of groups from which, policies and
opinions radiated,”

He classified Smuts with Wilson,

Clemenceau, Lloyd George, Orlando, Paderewski, Venizelos,
Makino, and Wellington Koo as ”among the statesmen having
distinct and enthusiastic followers,”3^4-

Clive Day, of the

American team of experts at the Conference, named Smuts,
as well as Lord Robert Cecil of England and Leon Bourgeois
of Prance, as one of the recognized intellectual and moral
leaders of the

d a y .

35

Harold HIcolson, the young British

diplomat who accompanied Smuts on his mission to Hungary,
recorded In his diary an admiration for Smuts that was just
short of adoration. 36

One of the most Interesting appraisals

was recorded by Ray Stannard Baker, the director of the
American press at Paris:
General Smuts was one of the two or three world
leaders developed by the Peace Conference. An

■^Winston L. S. Churchill, The Aftermath: The
World Crisis, 1913-1926 (Hew York: Charles Scribner's
Sons", 1929) 7 P • 1 3 2 ".”
3 I1

Edward Mandell House and Charles Seymour (eels. },
What Really .Happened at Paris (Hew York: Charles
Scribner's Sons, 1921) / P- v'i11.

35Clive Day, ”The Atmosphere and Organization of
the Peace Conference,” ibid., p. 2 7 .

36Harold Nicolson, Peacemaking, 1919 (2d ed.; Hew
York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 193917 pp. 292-303.
Chapter VI below.

See

xlf.
extraordinary man, sca.rcely fifty years old; one of the
youngest leaders at the Conference. . . , He developed
early as a thoroughgoing Idealist. . . . His knowledge
of world conditions was extensive and realistic. . . .
Pie was one of President Wilson’s strongest supporters.
Personally, he was a rather taciturn and unapproachable
man, with a high forehead, steely eyes, straight brows
depressed In a habitual half frown, tightly closed
lips, and a powerful chin; he was a man who looked the
part of the leader. He was always at hand when there
was difficult, work to d o . 37
There were, on the other hand, a few men at the
Conference who were not favorably impressed by Smuts.
Georges Clemenceau, the Prime Minister of Prance, in his
catalogue of the men at the Conference, referred to "Smuts
of South Africa, with his forced smile, who made the mis
take of leaving papers about in which he vented his spleen
against the

F r e n c h .

"3^

Herbert Hoover thought Smuts "had

full knowledge of Old World Diplomacy, an independent mind
and often real statesmanship."

He made It clear, however,

that he did not trust the South African.

He thought Smuts 1s

stand on mandates was mere trickery and so suspected his
motives in other

a r e a s .

39

Robert Lansing, the American

Secretary of State, cred_Ited Smuts with "Intellectual

37pay Stannard Baker, Woodrovir Wilson and World
Settlement (3 vols.; Gloucester, Massachusetts: Peter
Smith, 19'6'0), I, 22k.
38
Georges Clemenceau, Grandeur and Misery of Vic
tor:/, trans. P. M. Atkinson (New York: Ilarcourt, Brace
and Company, 1930) 9 P* 150.
39 Herbert Clark Hoover, The Ordeal of Woodrow
Wilson (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1958), pp.
2 3 )1, 2I.l2-1.I-3* See Chapter IV below.

15
honesty," as well as "kindliness and c o n s i d e r a t i o n , I n
another work, however, the most he would concede to Smuts
was a creative mind, while identifying him with those re
formers whose peculiar vanity is that they must invent
something new and different, not being willing to accept
methods which have been tested by experience.

This judg

ment was in connection with SmutsTs work on the mandates
system.^*
Smuts had gained a wealth of experience In various
fields prior to 1 9 1 9 anc^

attained to a position of

high esteem in the eyes of his fellow men.

Therefore,

being excellently prepared and equipped for the task of
negotiating a peace, he was able to play a prominent part
at the 1919 Ps-^is Peace Conference.

Robert Lansing, The Big Four and Others of the
Peace Conference (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1921),
p”I Idd. Cited hereafter as Big Four.
Ji.l
1 Robert

Lansing, The Peace Negotiations: A Per
sonal Narrative (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1921),
p^ 15o. Cited "hereafter as Peace negotiations.

CHAPTER II
SMUTS AND THE CONFERENCE ORGANIZATION
For an understanding of the role played by Smuts
at the Paris Peace Conference, some knowledge of its
organization and procedure is necessary.

First, the

Conference was not planned in advance; It grew out of the
organizations which the Allies had set up to conduct the
war.-*-

Second, It was not a static body, but changed from

time to time both in structure and procedure to conform to
the needs of the moment.^
extremely large body.

Third, the Conference was an

Long before the war was over, infor

mation-gathering organizations had been set up In France,
o
Great Britain, and the United States.- Many of the exr^erts
who had served with these organizations were included in the
delegations which went to Paris.

For example, the British

Empire delegation consisted of more than two hundred persons.

-*-F. S. Mars ton, The Peace Conference of 1919* Organisation and Procedure (London: Oxford University Press,
m w ,

p

.

t

.------

2

H. W* V. Temperley (ed.), A History of the Peace
Conference of Paris ( 6 vols.; London: Henry Frowde and
Hodder & Stoughton, 1 9 2 0 -2 l|) , I, 2 3 6 -lt3 .
3
Andre Tardieu, The Truth about the Treaty (Indian
apolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1921"), pp. 8 >-36 , 91 >
Charles Homer Haskins and Robert H. Lord, Some Problems of
the Peace Conference (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1 9 2 0 ), pp~» 2 2 -2 k.
^Marston, op. cit., p. 2 2 8 .
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Altogether, seventy plenipotentiaries, or one hundred and
four counting substitutes, and at least 1 , 0 3 7 other dele
gates represented twenty-seven states and five British
dominions at the Peace Conference.^
The Council of Ten, which consisted of the Heads
of the five great powers, Prance, G-reat Britain, the United
States, Italy, and Japan, and their Foreign Ministers,
acted as the steering committee for the unwieldy Confer
ence from January 12 until March 2l{.*

Although it met

almost daily throughout this period, it had no definite
program to follow and merely worked from day to day.

As a

result, It entirely failed to solve or even to tackle most
of the major problems facing the Conference. A Pour months
after the Armistice, only the military, naval, and air
terms of the treaty with Germany had been d.ecided upon*?
Before this body
. . . each special interest, each minor nationality,
had a chance to come forward and state its case,
usually at considerable length* Whatever was said
in French was translated into English, and vice
versa. The sessions grew long and tiresome, and
progress was slow.
The slowness of progress was not entirely due to the proce-

13

dupe adopted.

The Council of Ten had Inherited from the

Supreme Council of the war period a heavy burden of problems
of an economic nature.

Moreover, the Europe of 1919 v/as a

hungry Europe, and the Council feared that anarchy might
follow in the wake of hunger.

Therefore, it was concerned

with feeding the defeated peoples, which involved problems
of the blockade, of rationing, and of the transport of
materials.9
On March 2hr, the Heads of the British, American,
French, and Italian delegations withdrew from the Council
of Ten and began to meet as the Council of Pour.

At last

the directing body of the Conference had assumed a form
which enabled it to make rapid progress.

In the next six

weeks, It had settled many of the problems with which the
Council of Ten had been unable or unwilling to deal.

By

May 7, it had a treaty ready to present to G-ermany, and It
continued to be the real heart of the Conference until the
Treaty of Versailles was signed on June 23.^

After the

withdrawal of the Big Pour, the Foreign Ministers continued
to meet as the Council of Five.

An indication of the Im

portance of the various Councils of the Conference can be
inferred from the frequency of their meetings.

The Council

^Haskins and Lord, op. cit., p. 5? Temperley, op. cit.,
I, 25>6; Marston, 0 0 . cit., pt lOli.
Ibid., p. 16k.
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oT Ten met seventy-two times; the Council of Five met
thirty-nine times; but the Council of Four met one hun
dred and forty-five time s . H
In addition to the Councils, the Conference also
met in plenary sessions.

These sessions were formal in

nature; the program was thoroughly planned in advance and
rigidly controlled by Clemenceau as president of the Con
ference.

There were only six plenary sessions before the

treaty with G-ermany was signed, and the only one of these
to be of real Interest was that of February lip, when the
Covenant of the League of nations was presented by Woodrow
Wilson.
Other Important bodies at the Conference were the
special commissions or committees which were set up as the
need arose and to which questions were referred for pre
liminary study and report.

Five important territorial

commissions were organized, as well as commissions on the
League of nations, on reparations, on finance, on waterways,
and on many of the other problems of the peace.

A commission

usually consisted of one or two members from each of the
11

Tardieu, op. cit., p. 97; Lay, op. cit., p. 33.

12

Temperley, op. cit., I, 2l|-9-5>0; U.S., Department
of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the
United States, 1919* ^tie Paris Peace Conference (13 vols.;
Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 19lj.2-!j-7) 9
III, 208-39* Cited hereafter as For. Reis, of U.S., Peace
Conference.
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five great powers, plus a few other members from some of
the smaller powers.

According to Tardieu, before peace was

made with. Germany, there were fifty-eight of these bodies
which held a total of 1,61|_6 sessions.

Some of the best work

of the Conference was done by the commissions*

On the other

hand, some questions were never referred to them but were
held to be the exclusive province of the Big Four.^^
commissions did not frame treaty articles.

The

They gathered

and sifted all available information on the problem with
which they were dealing and reported their findings to the
Supreme Council, 1-1- which used the information to arrive at
a final decision as to how the treaty article should be
written.

The decision of the Council was then referred to

the Drafting Commission which rendered valuable service by
nclothing often loosely-worded decisions in concise and
explicit phrases, which could be inserted, directly into
the Treaty.
This unplanned, empirically-organized body of men,
representing the victors in the war, managed to get a

■^Temperley, op. cit., I, 257; Tardieu, op. cit.,
PP» 93* 97; Haskins and Lord, op. cit., pp. 28-30; Day,
op. cit., pp. 25-30. See For. Reis, of U.S., Peace Con
ference, III, 6 3 -9 0 9 ^or
composition of all the com
missions .
1

1

Prior to March 25* th.e Supreme Council was the
Council of Ten; after that date, it was the Council of Four.
15
//
Temperley, 0 0 . cit. , I, 2oo.
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treaty together by May 6.

On that day it was presented to
iA
a plenary session of the Conference,
and on the follov/-

ing day it was presented to the C-erman delegation . ^
The
-jp
Germans signed the treaty at Versailles on June 28.
Be
tween May 7 and June 28 the Allies and the Germans did not
meet; all communications concerning the treaty were carried
on in writing.^9
How did Smuts fit into the organization of the
Peace Conference?

The answer to this question involves

first of all the problem of the representation of the
British dominions at Paris in 1919*
The dominions, by declaring war instantly on the
decision of the mother country in 1 9 ll]-* had proclaimed
their belief in the rightness of that decision.
Fully as they approved, it was, however, a decision
which they had had no formal share in framing, and
to which they were formally bound, whether they liked
it or not, by the existing legal state of the impe
rial constitution. ^
Once committed to the war, the dominions, especially Canada,
Australia, and Hew Zealand, supported it 7/hole-heartedly,
as did India to a lesser extent.

The contributions of the

l8Fo:r. Reis, of U.S., Peace Conference, III, 33?l--79.
17Ibld., III, kl3-20.
l8Xbid., III, k21-23.
19
7Marston, op. cit., p. 1 9 2 .
^ J a m e s A. Williamson, A Short Histop y of British
Expansion: The Modern Empire and Commonwealth (kth ed. ;
London: Macmillan 5:” Co. , 195'8) * p"* 295-
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dominions named above were, in proportion to population,
as great as that of any of the European nations and was
far greater than that of the United S t a t e s T h e

domin

ions felt that their contributions to the war effort had
earned them complete nationhood and a right to control
their own foreign policy.

They insisted, therefore, on

the right to participate in the Peace Conference, apart
from Great Britain, and on an equality with at least the
o p

smaller nations represented. ^

Such insistence began at

the first Imperial War Conference in 1917 v/hen Sir Robert
Borden moved and Smuts seconded a resolution to that ef
fect.^

The following year, the dominion representatives

again pressed for separate representation at P a r i s . ^

On

the last day of 1918, the Imperial Cabinet adopted a proposal
submitted by Borden.
Under this proposal each Dominion was to have the
same representation as the smaller allied nations
and, in addition, representatives of the British
Empire were to be drawn from a panel on which each
Dominion Prime Minister would have a place. The
^
reoresentation of India was to be on the same basis. ^
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1

1

Temperley, op. cit., VI, 3d45 Williamson,
op. cit., pp. 288 -9 2 .
22

Ibid., p. 295; David Lloyd George, The Truth
about the Peace Treaties (2 vols.; London: Victor Gollancz, 193d) , I* 202-201].. Cited hereafter as Peace Treaties.

?Borden,

2

/ /
/
on. cit., II, oo7-7o.

!'Ibid., 1 1 , 8 6 6 -9 5 .
^ h b i d . , II, 89^-95*
Peace Treaties, I, 20o-209*

See also Lloyd George,
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In th.is struggle, Borden recorded that he had the Tull
backing or the other dominion representatives as v/ell as
of the British Prime Minister and his colleagues .^

When the Council or Ten began to meet on January
1 2 , the rirst question taken up was that or the represen

tation or the various nations.

It was at once agreed that

the main duty or drarting the treaties would remain in the
hands or the great powers*

The Council then decided which

other countries could have delegates and how many each
could have.

When the problem or the dominions was raised,

Lloyd George pressed Tor the plan accepted by the Imperial
Cabinet.

President Wilson entered a mild protest against

this Increase In the representation or the British Empire.
The solution rinally arrived at, on Wilson1s suggestion,
was that Canada, South Alrlca, Australia, and India were
each to have two representatives and New Zealand, one.
Newroundland was not to have separate representation.^
Under this arrangement Smuts became a plenipotentiary
from South Alrlca along with Prime Minister Louis Botha.

2 ^Bord.en, op. cit., II, 8 9 k.
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Lloyd George, Peace Treaties, I, 21/1-17; Temperley, op. c i t ., I, 2br7:=W 9 T
f
p o r . 'r8Is. of
U.S., Peace' "c'o'nierenco, III, '[.8 2 -8 9 , 5>31-33* Other
representation was as rollows: the five great powers
had rive delegates each; Belgium, Brasil, and Serbia
had three each; China, Czechoslovakia, Greece, Eedjaz,
Poland, Portugal, Rumania, and Siam had two each; most
or the Latin American countries had one delegate each.
Temperley, op. cit., I, l-S-98.
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The dominion representatives also formed a panel from which,
the fifth member of the British delegation was drawn.

In

this way, all of the dominion delegates served on one or
another of the important conference commissions.

General

Smuts was appointed to the one which drafted the League
ry O

of Nations Covenant.'1'
The British Empire delegation, consisting of six
separate delegations, also continued to function as a
unit.

It held regular meetings throughout the Conference,

usually -under the chairmanship of A. J. Balfour, the British
Foreign Minister, although Lloyd George led the group on
several important occasions.

At these meetings questions

of policy were discussed, and Lloyd George generally took
to the Supreme Council the views of the entire British
Empire rather than just those of the United Kingdom.

As

was his wont, General Smuts spoke seldom, but when he did
speak, he was listened to with respect and his views often
modified the final

d e c i s i o n .

^9

The most important body of the entire Conference
was the Council of Four, composed of Vittorio Orlando,
the Prime Minister of Italy, Clemenceau, Lloyd George, and
President Wilson.

Because of his special relationship with

arston, op. cit., p. 101; Lloyd George, Peace

two of the Big Four, Smuts was able to exercise an impor
tant influence on the Conference,

Orlando was the least

important member of the Big Four,

Partly because he could

not speak English, he did not take as active a part in the
general discussions of the Supreme Council as did the other
three, who used English freely among themselves.

Instead,

he and the other Italians at the Conference concentrated
their entire efforts on the advancement of Italy.30
ceau dominated the Conference.

Clemen-

As Prime Minister of the

host nation, he presided at the plenary sessions as well
as at the meetings of the Ten or Four.

He was shrewd,

clever, completely realistic In his approach to the prob
lems of peace, and passionately devoted to France.3^-

Much

that was in the final treaty could be traced to him.

There

is no evidence that Smuts influenced either Orlando or
Clemenceau in any way.
Lloyd George was above all a politician.

He was a

bluff and hearty opportunist whose behavior was sometimes
rather erratic as he tried to fit his actions to public
o p i n i o n .
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He and Smuts had worked together from the time

of the Imperial Conference of 1^17 * and each had formed a

30
Lansing, Big Four, pp. 121-22; Lloyd George,
Peace Treaties, I, 25>3; Tardieu, op. cit. , p. 101.
-^Ibld., p. 102; Lansing, Big Four, pp. 10-3&.
3 2 Xbid., pp. 77-73.
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warm appreciation for the other.

It was not until I9 L 3

tliat Smuts ranked Churchill as high, as Lloyd George as a
leader of the British people.33
Smuts:

Lloyd George said of

"It is difficult to overrate the importance of

the contribution General Smuts made to our peace prepara
tions. . . .

I have no hesitation in saying that Smuts

was the ablest man that came to help us from the outside
Empire."-^
be no doubt.

of Smuts's Influence on Lloyd George there can
One writer remarked:

Prom a talk with General Smuts he /Lloyd George/ would
go to a meeting of the T,Big Four" with proposals which
made M. Clemenceau wonder (sometimes aloud) whether the
Allies were to ask Germany's pardon for having taken
the liberty of beating h e r . 35
President Woodrow Wilson was the fourth of the Big
Pour.

Volumes have been written about his character and

personality and about his role at the Peace Conference—
much of it contradictory.

Smuts thought Wilson was a

greater man than Lincoln.

He praised Wilson's idealism

but thought he was not practical enough for the rough and
tumble of the Conference.

Unlike many, however, Smuts be

lieved Wilson was right to come to the Conference personally.
"Only Wilson could have put through the League and did.
The other statesmen weren't concerned about the League

"Smuts, Jr.,

op.

cit.,

p.

203.

-^'~Lloyd George, Peace Treaties, I, 2 6 0 -6 1 .
T. Raymond /Edward Raymond Thompson/, Mr. Lloyd
George (New York: George H. Doran Company, 1922) , pi 235*
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except as an instnment for their own ends--that is to
say their country’s ends: Wilson put the League above
this greedy squabbling. It was for the League he com
promised on other things”3^
Nor did Smuts believe that Wilson was "bamboozled” as Keynes
wrote in his classic caricature of the President,37

When

Smuts and Wilson met at the Conference, each discovered a
kindred spirit In the other.

Because of their common de

votion to the League of Nations, they easily developed a
mutual friendship.

The President had a sincere esteem and

affection for Smuts that surpassed his regard for any of
his American colleagues except Colonel

H o u s e . 3®

Smuts’s

influence on Wilson affected the final treaty in at least
three areas:

the League of Nations, the mandates system,

and reparations,39

3^Smuts, Jr., op. cit,, pp. 203“20Jjr. See also
Millin, op. cit., II, lo1-621 Jan Christian Smuts, “Wood
row Wilson’s Place In History,” Current History, XIV
(April, 1921),
37 John Maynard Keynes, The Economic Consequences
of the Peace (New'York: Harcourt, Brace and Howe, 1920),
~ 551 Smuts, Jr., op. cit., p. 2051 Millin, op. cit.,
II, 162.
38

Seth P. Tillman, Anglo-American Relations at the
Peace Conference of 1919 (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 19 31), p . 73•

39 See below, Chapters III, IV, and V. See also
George Curry, "Woodrow Wilson, Jan Smuts, and. the Ver
sailles Settlement,” The American Historical Review, LXVI
(July, 1 9 6 1 ), 963-86.

CHAPTER I I I

SHUTS AND TIIE LEAGUE OF NATIONS
Undoubtedly, the most important work done by Smuts
at the Paris Peace Conference was his part in formulating
the

Covenant of the League of Nations.

As early as Hay

lip, 1917a Smuts had supported the League of Nations Idea,
In a speech In the Central Hall, Westminster.

He said In

part:
In some form or other we must bring about a league
or a union of nations with, some common organ of
consultation on all vital Issues. . . . All the
schemes that I have heard of so far have failed to
carry conviction to my mind that they are practi
cal and that they will achieve the objects w© have
In view.' I would favour something more elastic,
something more flexible, something which will be
capable of adapting Itself to the very complex cir
cumstances which arise from time to time in our
complex European relations.
I think It would be the proper course that the
peace treaty which Is concluded after this war shall
contain as an integral part of it the fundamental
provisions, not in detail, bi.it in principle, which
will safegiiard the future peace of the world.
A month after the Armistice, Smuts published, on
December lo, 1913, a pamphlet entitled The League of ITatlons:

p

A Practical Suggestion.

This publication proved

to be very Important as many of the suggestions embodied

Smuts, War-Eime Speeches, pi. 5>5-6o.
p

David Hunter Hiller, The Drafting of the Covenant
(2 vols.; New York: G. P* Putnamrs Sons, 192d ), II, Docu
ment p, 23-60. Cited hereafter as Covenant .
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in it eventually were incorporated into the Covenant of the
League.

This was due in part, no doubt, to the universal

rule enunciated by Miller that "any definite detailed draft
prepared, in advance by one of the parties /meeting to pre
pare an agreement/ will to some extent appear in the final
text, not only in principle but even in

l a n g u a g e ,

"3 but it

was also due to the inherent excellence and practicality
of the document.

Students of the League of Nations have

been generous in their praise of this work.

One writer

said that it was the first plan for a League of Nations to
be 11deeply tinged with the idealism for which the post-war
world was w a i t i n g . L o r d Robert Cecil, who was one of
the most influential men in the history of the League in
his own right, praised Smuts's pamphlet as a brilliant per
formance.^

Another writer called it a "most remarkable

pamphlet 11 and one "which can never be too often consulted
by those who would understand the origin and development
r

of the League . " 0

Still another student of the League of

Nations wrote:
'X

"miHer, Covenant, I, 3.
h

/rFelix Horley, The Society of Nations (Washington:
The Brookings Institute*^ 1932) / p. 20/
5
S. A. Robert Cecil, Viscount Cecil, A Great ex
periment (New York: Oxford University Press, IQwl) , pT 6o.
<r

William S. Rappard, Uniting Burone (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1930) ,”pn/ 200, 261}..
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Tills great paper, expressed in cogent and moving
language, immediately had a profound effect. It
crystallised ideas and aspirations which had been
held In nany quarters, and made deep Impression
on both Lord Cecil and President W i l s o n . 7
Another writer commented:
General Smuts rendered a service to the advocates of
a realistic League by supporting them with the whole
weight of his authority as soldier, statesman and
philosopher, and it may be added, with the persuasive
power of his p e n . 3
The appreciation of Smuts*s pamphlet has grown with the
years.

A historian of the League of Nations, writing

in 1 9 5 2 , said of it:
Smuts *3 work was from every point of view the
climax of all the thought and labour expended on
the League idea before the Paris Conference. . . .
Zii7 was . . . the first plan put out to the world
by one who held a pre-eminent official position,
had played a prominent part in the conduct of the
war, and possessed unique experience in military
and political affairs. But the contents of the
pamphlet were even more remarkable than Its source.
Here at last was a work worthy of the greatness of
its subject. Here, in language worthy of Milton
or of Burke, were high idealism, acute political
insight, a profound understanding of the hopes and
sentiments of the rank and file of soldiers and
civilians, clear and practical administrative plan
ning. The purpose, and to a great extent the con
sequence, of Smuts*s proposals was to raise the
discussion on to a new plane

70 . K. Webster and Sydney Herbert, The League of
Nations in Theory and Practice (Boston: Houghton Llifflin
C ompany, 1933)* P • 37•
8

AIfred 2innern, The League of Nations and the
Rule of Lav/, 1913-1935 (London: Macmillan and Company,
1933), p. 209".
^F. p. Walters, A History of the League of Nations
(2 vols.; London:
Oxford tTriiverslty Press, 1952) > I» 27.
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Smuts*s pamphlet is composed of twenty-one short
articles ’
which are interspersed throughout a much more
lengthy argument in favor of his proposals.
are
deed

These comments

"written in a moving and apToealing style; tending in
to disarm criticism of the text of the Articles

suggested.1

1

jn the first article, Smuts suggested that

the setting up of a League of Hations should be considered
the primary task of the Peace Conference.-^-

The organiza

tion which Smuts envisioned, however, went beyond the idea
of a mere league to preserve peace.

He saw it as

. . . a great organ of the ordinary peaceful life of
civilization. . . . It is not sufficient for the
league merely to be a sort of deus ex machina, called
in in very grave emergencies when the siDectre of war
appears; if it is to last, It must be much more. It
must become part and parcel of the common International
life of states, It must be an ever visible, living
working organ of the polity of civilization. It must
function so strongly in the ordinary peaceful Inter
course of states that it becomes irresistible in their
disputes:
its jneace
activity must
-*■
TO be the foundation
and guarantee of its war power.
Professor Rappard commented on these lines:

"This concep

tion of the League as an agency of peaceful cooperation,
. . . came step by step to be shared also by the other
members of the Crillon

C ommission."-^

The earlier drafts

^Miller, Covenant, I, 3 )1.
, II, 27.
1 2 Ibifl., II, 2k-25.

Ujiappard, Uniting Europe , p. 2 6 3 .
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ol* Phillimore, House, and Wilson*^* Had pictured the League
as an international judge and policeman only.

It was due

to General Smuts that a broader view of the role of the
League was taken.

The League continued to develop along

the lines first suggested by Smuts.

By 1 9 2 9 , its "coopera

tive activities” had Ttcompletely eclipsed its coercive
functions.
Articles 2 through 9 contain Smuts*s plan for a
mandates system.

The development of this Idea deserves a

separate chapter and will not be dealt with here.-^
The next major section of Smuts*s plan, articles
10 through ill, contain the General*s Ideas on the consti
tution for the League.

On the one hand, he emphatically

rejected the idea that the League should become a super
state, but on the other hand, he just as emphatically
believed that it should be more than an Ineffective de
bating society.

Smuts thought that the scheme he had

worked out would avoid both of these extremes.

First, he

believed that the division of powers Into legislative,
executive, and judicial, was a natural division and should

3-^-See Miller, Covenant, II, for these plans:
Phillimore Plan, Document 1, pp. 3-6; House Plan, Docu
ment 2, pp. 7-11; Wilson*s first draft, Document 3>
pp. 12-15*
15>
r
/
Rappard, Uniting Europe, pp. 2 6 3 -6 5 •
■^See Chapter IV below.
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be followed in forming a constitution for the League . ^
The legislative branch he called the G-eneral Conference.
In this body all the states may be considered equal
and should vote as states. . . . The conference . . •
may become a most powerful and Influential factor In
moulding international public'opinion. . . • With
that public opinion behind it, / t lie lcs.gue7 may S°
confidently forward vjith its great tasks; deprived of
that support, all its power for good will be neu
tralized and nullified. . . . The enlightened public
all over the world will have to be taught to think
internationally, to look at public affairs, not merely
from the sectional national point of view, but also
from a broad human International point of view. And
the debates periodically taking place in the general
conference might well become of immense Importance In
this great task of forming and educating a strong body
of international opinion behind and in support of the
league and Its work. . . . The Powers should not grudge
strong representation to the smaller states, as In any
case the resolutions will only be in the nature of
recommendations to the national Parliaments.
In 1929 Professor Rappard wrote:
These lines, written two full years before the
first Assembly met, give an astonishingly true pic
ture of what that remarkable body Is and seems likely
ever more to become. Its periodic meetings, its
consiiltatlve character, Its main function as a focus
of what has come to be called the spirit of Geneva
and as an educator of national opinion, the publicity
and parliamentary tone of its debates, and the rela
tively important part played in It by the representa
tives of the minor states, all these traits, which
subsequent history has gradually revealed, G-eneral
Smuts foresaw with a truly prophetic eye. For once
. . . it was the statesman with the boldest imagina
tion and the highest ambitions who was right in his
previsions. Coming from a minor state, General Smuts
naturally did not share his British, American, end
French colleagues 1 rather contemptuous views of the

■^Miller, Covenant, II, 33-39*
l 3 Ibid., II, 3 9 - W , lt-5.
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international role of snail countries. . . • And coming
from a free and from a now state, with no diplomatic
service and no diplomatic traditions, lie naturally and
very rightly placed the political importance or parlia
mentary and of public opinion above that of ambassadors
and ministers.**-/
Because he believed that the General Conference
would be too large to do any real work, Smuts suggested a
Council of nine or ton members as the executive body of
the League.

He thought the great powers, which he named

as the United States, the British Empire, Prance, Japan,
and Germany, 11as soon as she has a stable democratic
Government,?f should be permanently represented on the
Council.

Two additional members of the Council should

be chosen from a panel of the intermediate powers and two
from a panel of the smaller powers.

A minority of three

should be able to veto any action of the Council.

Smuts

explained:
The advantage of this constitution is that the
Great Powers obtain a majority--although only a bare
majority--representation on the council and could not
therefore complain that their interests run the risk
of being swamped by the multiplicity of small states.
On the other hand the intermediate and minor states
receive a very substantial representation on the
league, and could not complain that they are at the
mercy of the Great Powers.^
I.Iorley commented that in these articles "devoted to the
constitutional organization of the League, the Smuts plan

■^Rappard, Uniting Europe, p. 207.
^Hiller, Covenant, II, ill.
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came closer than any of its predecessors to the ultimate
arrangement." 2 1

jn fact, in a few years' time the compo

sition of the Council came to follow the Practical Sugges
tion more closely than it did the Covenant, for Smuts had
suggested the system of regional representation which,
although not embodied in the Covenant, was later put into
practice.22

Furthermore, almost everyone who had suggested

a plan for a League of Nations had envisioned a body such
as the General Conference, but fewer had seen the need for
a smaller executive body such as Smuts called the Council.
Smuts next recommended three ideas which he thought
would go far toward outlawing war:

the abolition of con

scription, the limitation of armaments, and the nationali
zation of munitions factories. 2 k

He did not claim that

these proposals were original vdLth him, nor did he minimize
the difficulties inherent In them.

He realized that, If

they were to be carried out, a fundamental change would
have to take place in the realm of International relations.
It was just such a change that he hoped the League would
bring about.

He wrote:

"The psychological and moral

21

miorley, op. cit., p. 2 1 .

^ Ibid.; Hiller, Covenant, II, Iil-k2; Walters,
on. cit., I, 335.
^Miller, Covenant, I, 3 6 ; Horley, op. cit♦,
pp. 2 1 -2 2 .
p],

"'Hiller, Covenant, II, 52.
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conditions are ripe Tor a great change.

The moment has
o r~i
come for one of the great creative acts of history." ^
The final section of SmutsTs pamphlet, including

articles 1 8 through 2 1 , is concerned with the settlement
of international disputes.

It was not original with him,

but was taken largely from a plan prepared by a committee
advised by Lord Robert Cecil and headed, by Lord Phillimore,
one of the “most learned and high-minded" of the judges
of the High Court in England . ^ 6

Smuts did not outlaw wan

altogether, but merely provided that it should not be
allowed except as a final resort, after the dispute had.
been thoroughly Investigated and reported upon,

lie be

lieved that states would not agree to anything more drastic
at that time, but he expressed the hope that;
* * * if such a period of deliberation and delay is
established, there will be time for extreme war
passions to cool down, and for public opinion to be
aroused and organized on the side of peace. And. In
view of the enormous force which public opinion would
exert In such a case, the general expectation is that
it will prove effective, and that the delay, and the
opportunity thus given for further reflection and
the expression of public opinion, will in most cases
prevent the parties from going to war.^7
Smuts further suggested that, if any member of the League
attacked another member of the League, the offending

^Hiller, Covenant, II, ip7 •
^ L l o y d George, Peace Treaties, I,
^Miller, Covenant, II, 53*

60p-6o6.

party should “Ipso facto become at v/ar wl th all the other
members of the League, which shall subject It to complete
economic and financial

b

o

y

c

o

t

t

.

”23

Although the last four

articles of his plan were incorporated Into articles 12,
13, 1 5 9 and l6 of the Covenant, Srauts does not deserve the
credit for them as they were not original with him.
President Wilson received a copy of Smuts1s plan
shortly after his arrival in Europe in December 1913.
Lloyd George told a friend that V/ilson "swallowed It
whole” and that much of his plan was borrowed from Smuts.29
R. 3. Baker said, “The Smuts plan especially impressed
the President as being well thought out, and convinced him
that his own draft needed

r e v i s i o n .

”30

Wilson acknowledged

his debt to Smuts on at least t’wo occasions:

once, before

the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on August 1 9 ,
3.919,^ and earlier, before theCouncil

of Ten on January

21, 1919 9 when he explained how

his own plan for a League

of Nations had been formulated.

Hehad taken the Philli-

nore report, which had been sent to him in Hay of I9 1 S

^°Miller, Covenant, II, 55*
po
'George Allardice Riddell, First Baron Riddell,
Lord Riddell1s Intimate Diary of the Peace Conference and
After, 1913"-1923 (New York: Reynal & Hitchcock, 1 9 3 k) ,
p. 279.
-^R. S. Baker, 0 0 . cit., I, 22k.
-^U.S., Congressional Record, 6 6 th Cong., 1st Sess.,
1919, LVTII, Part k7 koi?.
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and had asked Colonel House to rewrite it for him.
then rewritten the draft prepared by Colonel House.

He had
After

his arrival in Europe, he had. studied, the plans prepared
by G-eneral Smuts and Lord Robert Cecil and had talked with
Leon Bourgeois, the foremost French advocate of a League
of Rations, after which he had. completely rewritten the
draft he had brought with him from America. 32

Baker

explained in more detail how President Wilson used SmutsTs
suggestions.
From Smuts he took over a whole new scheme of
organization, establishing a smaller Council in
addition to the general conference of the League.
. . . All this constitutional machinery was lifted
bodily from Smuts*s plan by Wilson. . . .
Smuts* s recommendations on the subject of arbi
tration and the guarantees surrounding it were also
taken over, partly in substitution for former clauses,
partly in addition to them. . . .
The article on reduction of armaments was expanded
by tvro paragraphs taken from Smuts--one on the aboli
tion of conscription, the other on the establishment
of scales of equipment and war material corresponding
to actual forces.
The most considerable section of new material
incorporated, in Wilson* s new draft from the Smuts

3^For. Reis, of U.S., Peace Conference, III,
These documents are all reprinted in Hiller,
Covenant, II: the Phillimore Plan, Document 1, pp.
3-8; House *s draft, Document 2, pp. 7-11; Wilson1s first
draft, Document 3* PP* 12-15; the Smuts plan, Document
5, pp. 23-60; the Cecil plan, Document 6 , po. 6i~61l;
Wilson*s second draft or first Paris draft, Document 7 9
pp. 65-93; Wilson*s third draft or second Paris draft,
Document 9> PP- 98-105; the Bourgeois plan, French text,
pp. If.03-11, English translation, pp. 23-8-56.
6 6 8 -6 9 *
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project was a set of four supplementary agreements
defining the mandatory system*33
The Council of Ten decided on January 21 that a
commission to draw up a constitution for a League of na
tions should be appointed*

Wilson suggested that the

commission be formed of those men who had already studied
the question*

Lloyd G-eorge agreed and at once named Smuts

and Cecil as the representatives of the British Empire*-^*
The following day the Coamcil further decided that the
League of Hations should be created, as an integral part
of the general treaty of peace.35

This, of course, had,

been Wilson’s goal for at least a year,3^ and it had also
been favored by Smuts. 37

On January 25, a plenary session

of the Conference gave formal approval to the two sugges
tions adopted earlier in the Council of Ten by agreeing
that the League of Nations should be created, as an integral

R. S. Bahor, op. cit., I, 225-26. See also
Miller, Covenant, X, IlO-IlI; Philip Baker, 11The Making of
the Covenant from the British Point of View,1* Les Orlgines
et L 1Oeuvre de la Societe des ITatlons, ed. P. Munch (2
vols. ; Copenhagen: Gyldendalske Boghandel, 1923-2)0 ,
II, 33.
Si1
//
IFor* Reis, of U.S., Peace Conference, III, 0 0 9 .
35lbld., III, 677-73.
3°See point fourteen of V/ilson's fourteen points,
U.S., Congressional Record, 6 5 th Cong., 2d Sess., 1913,
LVI, Part 1, 631.
35gee above, pp. 23 and 31. Rappard, Uniting
Europe, p. 250, said that Smuts "with Wilson did most to
tie up the League and the peace. '*
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part of the peace treaty, and by appointing a commission
to draw up a plan for the League.3°
The Commission on the League of Nations was the
most distinguished of any of the various commassions at
the Conference.

Initially, It was composed of two mem

bers from each of the five great powers plus one member
each from Belgium, Brazil, China, Portugal, and Serbia.
The smaller powers, however, asked for more representation
which was later granted to them by adding to the Commission
one member each from Poland, Greece, Rumania, and Czecho
slovakia.

President Wilson served as chairman with Colonel

HoLise as his second; Smuts and Cecil represented the Brit
ish Empire; Bourgeois was there for Prance and Orlando
for Italy; Baron Makino and Viscount Chinda represented
Japan.

Other distinguished members we re Hymans of Bel

gium, Wellington Koo of China, Venizelos of Greece, and
Dmowski of Poland.39
Although the Commission did not begin to meet until
February 3 j during January, Wilson, House, Cecil, and Smuts
held many Informal conferences to discuss the League.

On

3^For. Reis, of U.S., Peace Conference, III, 201,
203 - 20!],.
^Seymour, or. cit ., IV, 303; Webster and Herbert,
op. cit., pp. k2-!f_3; P. Baker, op. cit., p. 22, Hiller,
Covenant, II, 2 6 3 . The other members of the Commission
were Larnaude of Prance, Scialoja of Italy, Pessoa of
Brazil, Reis of Portugal, Vesnitch of Serbia, Dianandy of
Rumania, and Kramar of Czechoslovakia.

January 3 1 , after bringing their differences almost to a
vanishing point, they decided that D. H. Miller and C* J.
B. Hurst, the legal advisors to the delegations from the
United States and Great Britain, should draw up one final
draft, representing as nearly as possible what had been
informally decided upon in the previous weeks.^.0

The

resulting document, known as the JIurst-MIller draft,
was vised as the basis for discussion in the meetings of
the League Commission.

Because of the high caliber of the

British and American delegates and their advance prepara
tion, nit was Inevitable that the Covenant of the League
should be mainly an Anglo-Saxon document.

Both the

French and the Italians had presented plans for a League
of Nations, but these were almost completely ignored in
the discussions of the League Commission. 111
■
In ten meetings, from February 3 to February 13>
the Commission hammered out a Covenant of a League of
Nations for presentation to a plenary session of the
Conference.

It would have been Impossible to have accom-

^Seynour, on. cit., IV, 29lj--957 299~3y0;^R. S.
Baker, op. cit., I, 232; Miller, Covenant, I, 69-6?; Cecil,
on. cit.7 pp. 63-69; David Hunter Miller, My Diary at the
Conforence of Paris (21 vols.; By the author,' 192l6j7~T*
pp. 101-102. Cited hereafter as Diary.
1,*1
'• Miller, Covenant, II, 231-37.
^■‘‘
HYebster and Herbert, on. cit., pp. 33-39*
'"''^Miller, Covenant, I, 130-32.
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plished such, a task if the basic outlines of the scheme
had not been agreed upon beforehand.^little in these meetings.

Smuts spoke very

According to his latest biog

rapher, !,Iie kept himself deliberately in the background
so that other people more influential than he was (he
meant President Wilson) could take the credit for bringing
the League to birth and thereby feel all the more com
mitted to making a success of it.11^

Stephen Bonsai, who

was an American interpreter for the League Commission,
said:

nHis best work was done in committees and in mis

sionary work with recalcitrant delegates when he could
play . . .

a ’lone hand.111^

Smuts served on a sub-committee which drafted the
article defining the composition and the powers of the
Council.^'7

The final text of this article retains much

the same form that Smuts had originally conceived for it
in articles 12, 13, and ll.|_ of his Practical Suggestion.
Smuts also served on the sub-committee which chose Geneva
as the site for the permanent headquarters of the League.

W'-Pull accounts of all these meetings are in
Hiller, Covenant, I, 130-271 * II, 230-335*
'■-'^iancock, on. cit., p. 50? *
^Stephen Bonsai, Unfinished Business (Garden City,
Hew York: Doubleday, Doran and Company, I9 I4J’-) * P* 3k*
Sec also Seymour, on. cit., IV, 309 1 ?* Baker, op. cit.,
p. 25*
^Miller, Diary, I, 110, 35>o*

k3
The only other city that received serious consideration
was Brussels, but the members of the sub-committee, which
included House, Orlando, and Makino, thought it important
that the League have its headquarters in a neutral country
if it was to be associated with peace rather than war in
the minds of the people of the w o r l d . ^
An example of Smuts 1 s missionary work among the
other delegates has been preserved in as intimate a picture
of Smuts at work as can be fouind.

The Japanese delegates

on the League of XTations Commission proposed a definite
racial equality clause and constantly urged its inclusion
in the League Covenant.

The clause was continually watered

down until it became completely meaningless, but it was a
matter of “face 11 with the Jaioanese.

host of the delegates

on the Commission were personally \7illing to accept the
statement, but Hughes, the obstreperous Prime Minister of
Australia, proved the stumbling block.

He would hear of

no clause which might infringe upon Australians long
standing “whites only 11 policy.

He threatened to bring the

whole problem before a plenary session of the Conference
if any racial equality clause were put in the Covenant, and
the Japanese threatened to do the sense if it were left out.
1P
'"I* Seymour, op. cit., IV, Ipla; Bonsai, op. cit.,
p. l 6 8 ^ Miller, Covenant, I, );Al. The most thorough
discussion of the choice of a site for the League head
quarters is in Happard, Uniting Bur ope, pp. 229-J'i'-*

On March. 2 9 , at House's suggestion, Smuts talked with
Makino in the presence of Bonsai, who recorded in his
diary:
This gave me an excellent idea of the style and
technique of the South African when negotiating on
delicate ground. He was exceedingly friendly to
the formal Japanese delegate, but he made quite plain
what course he would pursue if Makino insisted upon
bringing the matter before the whole Conference in
a Plenary Session as it is rumored he proposes
doing.
Smuts told Makino that he would have to fall in line and
vote with Hughes and the other dominion representatives
even though he was personally sympathetic to the proposal.
He left the Japanese delegate with a warm handshake and
Bonsai drew the conclusion:

"Kind words may butter no

parsnips but they certainly softened Makino1s attitude
toward the white world.

In the end the racial equality

clause was not Inserted, and the Japanese swallowed their
pride and accepted. It, along with Shantung and. the ITorth
Pacific Islands.^
Although Smuts spoke rarely In the meetings of the
Commission, when he did speak, it was usually to the point
and often cleared up some matter that was causing disagree-

^Bonsal, op. cit., p. 1 6 9 .
5 0Ibid.,
-,
pp. 1 6 9 -7 0 . See also Seymour, or. cit.,
IV, 3019 -1 Jl, IlI’l-Ip; Borden, op. cit., II, 926-23; P.
Baker, Q'o. cit., p. 2d.
(London:

^ P a u l Birdsail, Versailles Twenty Years After
George Allen k Unwin, id!'.!) , pp. 9 1-101.

ment.

An example occurred at the third meeting of the

Commission on February 5*

President Wilson proposed that

only self-governing states and colonies be admitted to
the League,

A lengthy discussion followed as to what the

term nself-governing 11 meant,

Wilson himself admitted that

he had lectured for twenty years on self-governing states
and still could not define one.

Lord Robert Cecil thought

India should be a member of the League, even though he
admitted that it was not self-governing,

Wilson agreed

that India should be a member, but indicated that he could
not reconcile such admission to his proposal.

At this

point Smuts spoke briefly and reminded all that there was
really no problem.

The Covenant, he said, would provide

that all signers of the treaty were to be members of the
League, and, since India would sign the treaty, membership
vj-ould follow automatically.

This cleared up the situation

to the apparent relief of all.

A minor Incident, perhaps,

but It illustrates the clear thinking and sharp Insight
of S m u t s . ^
When the first phase of the negotiations on the
drafting of the Covenant was drawing to a close, Smuts
attempted to change the proposed constitution of the
League as it was then developing, even though the ideas

-miillor, Covenant, I, loL-C>7; Seymour, o'o. cit.,
IV, 311-

h.6
h.e had expressed in his Practical Sunrtestion had verr
in—

largely been followed.

■■

ii ■

i

ii ■■■hi ■

■

i a iiit’
n ri

+

fJ

On February 13, at tho ninth,

meeting of the Commission, he offered an amendment to
provide for what Hiller called a “Representative Assem
bly, n in addition to the Council amid Assembly already
decided upon.

He wanted this body to be composed of

11representatives chosen out of the legislative assemblies

or political parties of the states.rT The idea behind this
suggestion was that, inasmuch as the Assembly would be
composed of delegates apoointed by the various governments,
there should be provision made for a representation of the
people as distinct from their governments.

The result

would be a “leagiie of peoples ’1 rather than a “league of
governments.”

Governments were supposed, to be 11conserva

tive” whereas the people were “liberal.”

This suggestion

was very vague and hardly in keeping with the practicality
so frequently displayed by Smuts.

Ho other member of the

Commission favored such a proposal; it was never put to a
vote, but simply disappeared in the ensuing discussions.-53
There is no indication in the minutes of the League Com
mission that Smuts ever pressed this idea very far.

In

his Practical Suggestion he had included the sentence:
“Both the Governments and Parliaments of the states might
send delegates, and perhaps even parties could be repre-

^ 3 Hillor, Covenant, I, 231, 272-75.

hi

sented by the selection of members on the principle or
proportional representation, n5hr but the idea is not em
bodied in his twenty-one articles.

neither did Smuts at

the Peace Conference or later express any disappointment
in the way the Covenant was drafted; quite the contrary
was true.

It seems then that Smuts did not really believe

very strongly in this rather vague and impractical plan*
It Is possible that he introduced it at the insistence of
his liberal following.

r-' p'

The completed Covenant was presented to a plenary
session of the Conference by President Wilson on February
ll.

!,A living thing Is born , 11 he said of the document of
o’A
which he was so rightfully p r o u d . I t was then deposited
with the Bureau of the Conference for examination and dis
cussion by all the Interested powers.
Covenant was taken at that t i m e . ^

!To vote on the

This draft was 5Ireally

submitted to the world for comment; and comment came in a

-Miller, Covenant, II, al. Italics mine,
qg
An indication that this might have been the case
can be found in Seymour, on. cit. , IV, 313•
For. Reis, of U.S., Peace Conference, III, 212.
Sir Robert Borden was disappointed in Wilson’s speech. Ee
wrote:
,?Wilson should have expressed appreciation of
General Smuts’ work upon which the proposals reported were
very largely based; as a matter of fact the only concrete
proposals placed before the Committee emanated from the
British Delegation . 11 Borden, op. cit. , II, 913*
37
Dor. Reis, of 13*3* , Peace Conference, III, 230.

k3
flood of criticism and suggestion of all kinds and from
all quarters, friendly and hostile, important and unim
portant. ”5^
President Wilson was away from Paris from February
ik to March lk.

When he returned, the Covenant was re

drafted in the light of the suggestions received.

Smuts

contributed nothing significant to this phase of the
drafting*

In fact, he was absent from three of

meetings held in March and April;

the five

on the two occasions

when he was present, he did not enter into the discussions.59
The final draft of the Covenant was presented to
a plenary session of the Conference on April 23; President
YiTilson again presided.

In the voting which followed, the

Covenant was accepted unanimously. 60

After the meeting,

Smuts joined House and Bonsai, who recorded Smuts1s reac
tions on that historic occasion:
The Afrikander was torn with doubts as to the jus
tice and even the efficacy of the Treaty in its
present incomplete form. For several weeks now
hardly a day had passed without a suggestion of
changes coming from him. He seemed very tired.
Certainly he was not sharing the exultant mood
that shone on the faces of at least a majority
of the delegates. He shrugged his shoulders in
answer to an unspoken inquiry from the Colonel
and then, r,The Peace Treaty may fade Into oblivion-and- that would be, I sometimes think, a merciful

^Miller, Covenant, I, 2 7 6 .
g9 Ibid., I, 336-53, !|-39-52.
Reis,

of U.S., Peace Conference, III, 3lk«

].i.9

dispensation of a kind Providence— but the Covenant
will stand--as sure as fate. It nust and snail suc
ceed because there Is no.other way to salvage the
fixture of civilization."^
Of his own role In the founding of tho League of
Nations Smuts said:
"All else I have done in my lifetime is as nothing
and
as dustand ashes compared with the small ef
fort I havebeen able to contribute towards the
building up of this new organization for the future
government of the world, "62Smuts continued to believe in the League of Nations
throughout his long life.

He even wove It into the sys

tem of philosophy which he set forth In a book published
seven years after the Peace Conference,

He wrote:

The creation of wholes, and ever more highly organized
vfholes, and of wholeness generally as characteristic
of existence, Is an Inherent character of the universe.
♦ .. Holism is
not confined to the biological domain
but
reachesits highest expressions and results on the
mental and spiritual planes of existence.
Thus the League of Nations, the chief constructive
outcome of the G-reat War, Is but the expression of the
deeply-felt aspiration towards a more stable holistic
human society. And the faith has been strengthened
in me that what has here been called Holism Is at work
even In the conflicts and confusions of men; that in
spite of all appearances to the contrary, eventual
victory Is serenely and securely waiting, and that the
Immeasurable sacrifices have not been in vain.^3
i
Bonsai, op. cit., p. 21J

6>1

York:
coined

/
°%IIllIn, op. cit., II, 30.
o3
J an Chr i s11 an Smu t s , Holism and Evolution (ITew
The Llacmillan Co., 19 2o), pp~.~ 99,
Smuts
the word "holism" from the G-reck word for whole.
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Smuts did not lose his faith even vr on a second
world war seemingly killed the League.

When the repre

sentatives of fifty nations met in San Francisco in 19l'-5>
to draft another constitution for another international
organization, which they hoped would be better than the
first, Smuts was again among the delegates.

As an elder

statesman he was appointed president of the General
Assembly, one of the four major commissions at the Con
ference.

He was also largely responsible for the wording

of the preamble to the United Hations Charter.

"The

charter itself was a cold legalistic document, but the
preamble was a warmer human document which set out plainly
world hopes and aspirations.

By it, perhaps more than
/1

anything else, the charter will, one day be remembered . 11 ^
In San Francisco the League which Smuts helped to form
in 1919 was reborn and lives today in the United Hations. ^
If the United Nations, or some succeeding organisation of
states in some future age, eventually brings about per
petual peace on this globo, Jan Christian Smuts of South
Africa will rank among those whose vision made that peace
possible.

^ LSnuts, Jr., op. cit., p. 3^7 •
0 ^Walters,

0 0 . cit., II, oll-lp-

CHAPTER I V

SMUTS AHD THE LIAHDATES SYSTEM
Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Ra
tions provided for a system of mandates for administering
the former German colonies and certa.in parts of the de
funct Turkish Empire#

General Smuts played a leading role

in the creation of this system.

In his pamphlet on the

League of Rations, Smuts devoted articles 2 through 9, or
about one-third of the total work, to the exposition of
his Idea that the League of Rations should become the
11reversionary In the most general sense11 of the npeoples
and territories formerly belonging to Russia, AustriaHungary, and Turkey # 11

The administration of these terri

tories, Smuts believed, should be the exclusive function
of the League of Rations#

He rejected, however, direct

exercise of that control by the League because he believed
such International control had never worked In the past.
He suggested Instead that the League appoint one of its
members as its agent or nmandatary r3 for each of the terri
tories under its control#

He further suggested that the

League set forth in a special act or charter for each man
dated. territory the policy which the League expected the
mand.atary to follow in that territory.

Although the char

ters would vary according to the state of development of
the territory and. Its people, they would all contain certa

52
basic provisions, such as the maintenance of the open door
policy in economic matters and the restriction of military
forces to those necessary for internal security*

Further

more, Smuts believed that the mandated territory should
have the right of appeal to the League in case the manda
tary abused, its responsibilities*

The League, in such

cases, should have the power to remove the controlling
state and replace it by another.

Also, each mandatary

should furnish periodic reports to the League with respect
to the territory under its supervision.
A comparison of Smuts1s ideas, as expressed in his
Practical Suggestion, with Article 22 of the Covenant will
show many similarities.

The greatest difference is in the

territories to which Article 22 applied.*

Hone of the for

mer Russian and Austro-Hungarian territories were ever
administered under the League of nations.

On the other

hand, the former German colonies in Africa and in the
Pacific were included as mandates even though Smuts had
specifically excluded these areas because they were

in

habited by barbarians, who not only cannot possibly govern
themselves, but to whom it would be impracticable to apply
any idea of political self-determination in the European

"Sillier, Covenant, II, 2 o-3 7 .

Smuts used the
swelling "mandatary,u~but in the English language text
of the Covenant the spelling “mandatory" was adopted.

Q
sense . 11

This difference was due almost entirely to Presi

dent 7/iIs on*
It has been shown above^ that Wilson was much inpros sod by Smutsfs pamphlet, and that he revised his own
plan after seeing It*

The draft he brought from America

did not include anything comparable to Smuts1s mandates
system#^

The three drafts which he prepared after arriving

In Europe, however, all contained, In a number of supple
mentary agreements, a plan for a system of mandates, which,
he took over from SmutsTs pamphlet*

From the first, Wilson

Included the German colonies and excluded any mention of
Russia In his suggestions, and in his last draft he men
tioned only the German colonies and certain former Turkish
territories*

These were the territories that eventually

were included under Article 22. ^
It must not be supnosed that the idea of a mandates
plan was entirely new to Wilson when he saw it in Smuts*s
pamphlet.

In fact, on December 10, 1913, while on route to

Eurooe on the George Washington, Wilson said to some of his
-■ ■■ !— !.— » ■ ■ ■ » ■' ■■■■
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advisors that nthe German colonles should be declared the

^Miller, Covenant, II, 28.
^Chapter III, pp. 37-39.
I,
“Hiller, C oven ant, II, Document 3, pp. 12-lp.
i
—f

^Ibid* , II, Document 7> PP» 65-93; Document 9 * D’1*
93-105; Document ik, pp. lk5“5>k. See also ibid * , I, 101-102
R. S. Baker, op. cit *, I, 226.
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common property of the League of Rations and administered
by small nations.

Also, the official commentary on

Wilson1s fourteen points, prepared under the direction of
Colonel House and accepted by Wilson, suggested something
like the mandatory scheme, a.1 though the word itself was
not used .'*7

At least two writers have suggested that, prior

to his seeing Smuts*s pamphlet, Wilson had not thought of
Incorporating his ideas on the colonial settlement Into the
League of Rations Covenant, but had thought of that settle
ment as a matter to be dealt with prior to and apart from
the League of Rations.^

One of these writers credited

Smuts with having much the same Idea concerning the settle
ment of the colonial claims, which accounts for his not
mentioning the German colonies in his discussion of his
mandates proposal.^
Smuts, of course, had very definite views on the
disposition of the German colonies.

He and Botha had. con

quered German South West Africa and they meant to keep it.
They also hoped to exchange part of German hast Africa,

^Miller, Covenant, I, lp3*

Italics in original.

Seymour, op. cit., IV, 156.
^R. S. Baker, op. cit., I, 2o5; Pittman B. Potter,
"Origin of the System of Mandates under the League of Ra
tions , 11 American Political Science Review, XVI (Hovenbcr,
1 9 2 2 ), 5 W .
^Ibid., p. 5 7 6 .

which Smuts had conquered, for Delogoa Bay in Portuguese
East A f r i c a , S m u t s

expected Great Britain to keep the

rest of German East Africa*

Under no circumstances was

Germany to be allowed to keep that strategically located
colony. 3-3One of the few things upon which the Allies were
in complete agreement at the Peace Conferonce was that
none of Germany*s former colonies were to be returned to
her*

Such had been the decision of the Imperial War Cabi

net late in 1 9 1 3 .3-2

Such also was the unanimous decision

of the Council of Ten on January 2k, 191 9 ; ^ almost no
discussion was needed to arrive at that decision.

What

should be done with the German colonies was not decided
so easily*

In fact, that problem proved to be the first

major controversy of the Conference.

The dominion repre

sentatives in the Imperial War Cabinet had supported the
claims of South Africa, Australia, and New Zealand to the
colonies which their respective armies had conquered.^
Lloyd George was perfectly v/Illing to abide by their

^Hancock, op * cit*, p. 1l37 •
Jan Christian Smuts, "East Africa,rT The Century,
XCVI (July, 1913), 309-13.
^■^Lloyd George, Peace Treaties, I, llp-lG.
3-3pop# Reis, of U.S., Peace Conference, III, 713.
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decision, but, before the matter was settled, it came up
against the strong opposition of Wilson.
The Council of Ten spent the week of January 2h.
to January 30 discussing the problem of the German colonies.
At the first of these meetings Smuts put in a claim for
South West Africa on behalf of the Union of South Africa;
Prime Minister Massey claimed German Samoa on behalf of
New Zealand; and Prime Minister Hughes asked for German
Hew Guinea on behalf of Australia.

These men based their

requests not only upon the fact that their respective
armies had conquered the territor5.es in question but also
upon the fact that the territories v/ere of strategic im
portance to their future security.

They did not want a

repetition of the threat that had been inherent in the
German possession of these lands .^-5

In subsequent meetings

the Japanese claimed the North Pacific islands,
French claimed Togoland and the Cameroons.^-^

1

f

and, the

Against all

these claims Wilson fought persistently, but alone.

He

advocated instead the mandates plan of Smuts as modified
by himself*

When pressed closely, however, he admitted

that there was little administrative difference between

15For. Reis, of U.S., Peace Conference, III,
719-23.
1A

Ibid., Ill, 733-IlO.
17ibia., xii, 753-63.

his idea of a mandate and outright annexation."^

Lloyd

George was willing to accept the mandatory scheme on be
half of Great Britain, but he could not speak for the
dominion representatives, nor could he persuade them to
accept it.
Meanwhile, Smuts had been busy behind the scenes
trying to effect a compromise acceptable to both Wilson
and the dominion representatives.

On January 29, Miller

and House both saw a draft of a compromise resolution
prepared by Smut s. 3*9

Later that day, in a meeting of the

British Empire delegation, the dominion representatives
were persuaded to accept the Smuts resolution,^

This

resolution provided that the former German colonies and
parts of the Turkish Empire should be administered as
mandates under the League of Hations.

The compromise

worked out by Smuts divided the mandates into three classe
The first class applied to the former Turkish possessions
which were almost ready to stand alone.

The second class

applied to the territories of central Africa where the

^'JFor. Reis, of U.S., Peace Conference, III,
7IlO-L3.
^Miller, Diary, I, 9 6 ; Seymour, op. cit., IV,
According to J. R. M. Biitler, Lord Lothian (London:
Macmillan & Co., i9 6 0 ), p. 75* Philip Herr, Lloyd George 1 s
private secretary, helped Smuts draft this resolution.
2 9 O.

^Seymour, op. cit., IV, 293; Lloyd George, Peace
Treaties, I, 533.
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people
• • • are at such a stage that the mandatory must
be responsible Tor the administration of the terri
tory subject to conditions which will guarantee the
prohibition of abuses such as the slave tra.de, the
arms traffic and the liquor traffic and the preven
tion of the military training of the natives for
other than police purposes, and the establishment
of fortifications or military and naval bases, and
will also secure equal opportunities for the trade
and commerce of other members of the League of ra
tions .
The third class applied to those
. . . territories, such as South-West Africa and
certain of the Islands in the South Pacific, which,
owing to the sparseness of their population, or
their small size, or their remoteness from the cen
tres of civilization, or their geographical conti
guity to the mandatory state, and other circumstances,
can be best administered under the laws of the man
datory sta.te as integral portions thereof, subject
to the safeguards above-mentioned in the interests
of the indigenous population.^On January 30, after a lengthy and heated discussion, the
Council of Ten adopted the Smuts resolution,

Hughes and

Massey made it clear that they still preferred outright
annexation, but, in order not to hold up the entire Peace
Conference, they would accept the compromise if the clause
providing for the third, class of mandates remained intact.

pp

In the week of discussions which led to the accept
ance of the mandates principle, the mandates themselves

^ Miller, Covenant, I, 109-110. Lloyd George,
poace Treaties, I, "53'3-IlI,' prints this resolution but
says nothing of Smuts’s role In preparing it.
22

735-317.

For. Reis, of U.S., Peace Conference, III,
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were not specifically distributed.

This was not done until

May 7 and not until 1920 in the case of the Turkish terri
tories.

nevertheless, the ultimate distribution of the

mandates was understood by everyone present.

The dominion

representatives would not have agreed to the solution un
less they had known that they were to receive the terri
tories they desired as T,CT* mandates.

ITor would Clemenceau

have agreed to the mandates principle without the tacit
understanding that France was to receive certain mandates
In central

A f r i c a .

^3

The Commission on the League of nations considered
the question of mandates on February 3.

When the mandates

article of the Hurst-MIller draft was read, General Smuts
presented as a substitute a resolution almost identical to
the one accepted by the Council of Ten 011 January 30*
Bonsai recorded the scene:
This was a field day or rather night at the
Peace table, and for once General Smuts, as chair
man of the committee charged with the difficult
task of drawing up the mandate provisions of the
Covenant, held the center of the stage, and the
general opinion is, Including the President 1 s, that
he performed his job SLiperbly.
Blushing profusely, the South African opened his
speech of explanation and apology In a very modest
strain. And If this was tactics it was very wise.
T*It is true,iT he began, 11that I present this
article to your careful and, I hope, prayerful
consideration, with some misgiving, because I would
be less than frank If I did not tell you that I an

23]vliller, Covenant, I, llk-15.

6o
ashamed of it; and* as I have abundant reason to
know, all the gentlemen v/ho worked with me upon it*
each and every one of them* are also disappointed
at the result of our labors. But do not misunder
stand me; distressing to our pride as is this con
fession and. falling far short* as does our plan, of
the objective which we hoped to attain* the article
that we place before you is the best we can do now.
In this belief we are all united.
f,If you give your sanction to our work you will
demonstrate that world public opinion is in favor
of the ultimate self-government of all peoples,
without distinction as to race* religion* or color*
or previous condition of servitude. It also pro
vides for a careful supervision and scrutiny as to
the way in which the mandates are exercised and how
the officers v/ho shall be responsible for this great
task are to be appointed.
"Now I shall close on a word of warning* based
on the knowledge which has come to me as the result
of many a long, weary, and at times bitter discussion
in the committee. You will see many things you would
like to change— just as I do* but I beg of you if our
plan is pointed in the right direction, let it stand.
It is not as responsive to your Ideals* or to mine,
as we had all hoped to make it* but hold your hand*
restrain your natural disappointment* for If our edi
fice, poor as it is* Is touched, I firmly believe It
will fall to the ground* not to be raised again I
fear In your day and mine . 51
Smuts*s manly confession and frank warning against
permitting the Committee battles to be fought over
again in the Commission won out* and the mandate pro
visions on both the first and second readings were
accepted* rather than approved without any substantial
changes. . . .
It was a great triumph for Smuts* and the Presi
dent quite visibly was pleased.
Of course, the best argument for not tampering with the
article presented by Smuts was that It had already been
accepted by the Supreme Council of the Conference as had

^'‘Bonaal* op. cit.* pp.
Covenant, II, 275*

See also killer,

no other article of the Covenant.

From this meeting on

February 8 until its final incorporation In the Covenant
and the treaty, the mandates article changed scarcely at
all.
Although Smuts was the first to suggest a system
of mandates under the League of Nations and was also the
chief author of Article 22 of the Covenant* It must not
be supposed that the idea was entirely a product of his
own creative brain.

He had received inspiration from

many sources--the chief of them being the British Empire.
He explained in his Practical Suggestion that the United
Kingdom, the dominions, and India were like the members
of a League of nations, whereas the minor parts of the
Empire, such as the crown colonies and protectorates,
were like the mandates.

He believed that "where the

British Empire has been so eminently successful as a
political system, the league, working on somewhat similar
lines, could, not fail to achieve a reasonable measure of
success.1'2^

R. S. Baker suggested that Smuts borrowed the

mandate idea from the Inter-Allled Labour and Socialist
program of February I9 I8 .

This program set ou.t a scheme

for a League of Nations and for the administration of
Armenia, Llesopotamla, and Arabia, as well as the colonies
p r'
Sillier, Covenant, II, 37-
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of tropical Africa, under League supervision. ^ 0

Further

more, Smuts was influenced by the Round Table group,
which included such men as Philip Kerr, Lionel Curtis,
F. S. Oliver, and Lord Robert Cecil . ^

Smuts frequently

met Kerr during the war years and could easily have re
ceived ideas from him and from the others of the group
oo
through him. ^
George Louis Beer of the United States may also
have influenced Smuts*s ideas on the mandates system.
In the years before the war, Beer had spent much time In
London where he too became acquainted with the Round Table
group and became the American correspondent for Its maga
zine. ^9

He was later appointed the colonial expert of

Colonel House* s Inquiry.

In his report 011 Mesopotamia

for the Inquiry, finished January 1, 1913* Beer suggested
that backward regions be entrusted "by International man
date" to one state subject to safeguards for the natives . 30

26

R. S. Baker, op. cit., I, 227 , Temperley,
op. cit., I, 217.
27
Potter, op ♦ cit. , p. 5t>3s Temperley, op. cit.,
VI, 501; David Hunter Miller, "The Making of the League
of Nations , 11 House and Seymour, op. cit., p. Ll03.
^Butler, op. cit., p. 6 5 .
^George Louis Beer, African questions at the Paris
Peace Conference, ed, Louis Herbert Gray (Hew York: Macmillan and Company, 1 9 2 3 ), p. xvii.
3 °Ibxd., p. hrZh,.

°3
The editor of Beer’s papers said that this was the first
use of the word ’’mandate" in the sense in which it came
to be used in the League of nations Covenant,^

Another

paper prepared, by Beer, probably between January 1 and 21,
1 9 1 9 9 ^^ contained in summary form recommendations for the

disposition of the former G-erman colonies.

Beer’s memo

randum read:
The administration of the derelict territories and
peoples freed from G-erman and Turkish rule must, in
general, be entrusted to different states acting as
mandatories of the League of nations. These mandates
cannot, however, be uniform, but must vary with the
circumstances of the different c a s e s , 33
As this was a private memorandum for the use of the American
negotiators, Smuts certainly did not see it, but the ideas
contained therein may have reached him through some member
of the Round Table group either before the publication of
his original plan, or at least before his preparation of
the resolution adopted by the Council of Ten on January 3d,
Of course, it is equally possible that it was Smuts who
influenced Beer,

It is Interesting to note that Beer recom

mended that German South West Africa bo incorporated Into
the Union of South Africa and that German Hew Guinea be
added to the Australian section of Hew Guinea,

In Beer’s

3^-Boer, op, cit., p. xix.
IP James T. Shot we 11, At the Paris Peace Conference
(Hew York: Macmillan Co., 1937TjJ PP. lOl-lOP, 133-3'
■^Beer, op. cit., pp. 1i_31-32«

opinion, the mandatory principle uas !,not advisable and
would serve no useful purpose 11 in either of these terri
tories.
It seems clear from the above that Smuts played a
major role In the creation of the mandates system.

To

evaluate that role, it is necessary to evaluate the system.
At first there were a good many men who d.efinitely did not
like the idea of mandates.

Secretary of State Robert Lan

sing thought it was too revolutionary* it left unsolved
too many legal questions concerning sovereignty.

Further

more, It was a way to take enemy territory without appearing
to d.o so; it was just a 11subterfuge which deceived no one.n35
An American scholar, writing in 1<}21, held, a similar opinion*
Ke said that the mandatory scheme was adopted by European
statesmen as a scheme to disguise under a cloak of nvirtuous
self-abnegation11 their annexations of German property . ^ 0
A noted British colonial administrator, writing In 1923,
said that at one time he and many others had thought that
a more effective way could have been found to settle the
colonial question, but he now thought that, In view of the
difficu.lt situation facing the Allies at the Peace Confer-

'"Boer, 0 0 . cit., p;.
'><-57-53.
oq
,
"^Lansing, Peace Negotiations, pp. 3a, lf>o*
■^Herbert Adams Gibbons, "The Defects of the System
of Llandates," Annals of the American Academy of Political
and Social Science , XCVT T^uly, 192T5T"37i--90.
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ence, the mandates system offered the best possible solu
tion. 67

Herbert Hoover did not like the idea in 1919 and

apparently never changed his opinion.

He wrote in 1956:

General Smuts 1 formula, thus introduced in the
Covenant, was one of the most monumental attainments
in the history of Old World diplomacy. . . .
Ho one since has been able to find any practical
difference between these mandated areas and the other
British, French, Italian or Japanese colonies or
imperial possessions.36
In his last statement Hoover was certainly wrong,
for many opinions can be found in favor of the system.

As

early as 1 9 2 5 it was said that the mandates system was not
the veiled, form of annexation claimed by its critics but a
symbol of a new and progressive imperialism; the system
had. surpassed all former attempts at international control
over colonies.39

Birdsall wrote that Wilson made great

concessions when he accepted Smuts 1 s compromise, '*but It
was an accomplishment to have extracted an unwilling assent
to the universality of the trusteeship principle . . . and
to have endowed the League of nations with rights of
supervision."^

A very cautious American scholar said that

■^Frederick D. Lugard, "The mandates System , 11
Edinburg Review, CCXXXVIII (October, 1923), 39§-ko3.
33jloover, op. cit., p. 2 2 k.
39Walter Russell Batsell, 11Summary of the Work of
the Sessions of the Permanent Mandates Commission,u Inter
national Conciliation, Ho. 213 (October, 1925), 50-5l»
^Birdsall, op. cit., pp. 73-7*!-*
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the system had proved a practical method Tor administering
backward areas, more satisfactory than others that had
been tried from the standpoint of the natives and the world
in general.

He observed that British methods in the man

dated Tanganyika were preferable to those in Kenya, and
French methods in Togoland and the Cameroons were better
than those in French West and Equatorial Africa.

He fur

ther observed that the system had developed policies
favorable to native health, agriculture, education, and
security.^-

Miller1s opinion was:

Even in the 11C” mandates . . . the principle
of trusteeship is firmly establishedi. . . . And
as to the other territories in Africa and those
formerly in Turkey, the world took a very long
step forwarji when Article 22 of the Covenant came
into* force .8-2
Professor Rappard, who served for many years as a member
of the permanent Mandates Cora-mission of the League of na
tions, wrote in 19^-6 that, except for the Japanese man
date, the mandates system was the most successful of the
various innovations introduced into the law and practice
of nations by the League.^*3
),*]
Quincy Wright, Mandates Under the League of Ilations (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1930),
i W T 31,
567.
]|p
"'“Miller, Covenant, I, 103*
I^
^ iYilliam E. Rappard, "The Mandates and the Inter
national Trusteeship Systems," Political Science Quarterly,
LXI (September, 1 9 I4.0 ), I4.O8 -I9 .
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Further proof that the system was not just the old
imperialism camouflaged was that by 1 9 6 2 all of the IfA rf
and TtB" mandates had become independent states.

The worst

failure of the system was Japan 1 s use of its flG" mandated
North Pacific islands as bases for aggression against the
United States in I9 I4-I.
own South Africa.

The other failure was in Smuts *s

The Union, in 1 9 6 2 , still held South

West Africa and had virtually incorporated it into its
own t erritory.kh-

V uKenneth Bradley (ed.), The Living Commonwealth
““‘
(London: Hutchinson Cz Co., 1961)7 pY I1 6 0 Y

CHAPTER V

SMUTS AITD REPARATIONS
When the war ended in November I9 IS, much of Prance
and Belgium lay in ruins.

The Allies had expended unprece

dented sums to defeat the Central Powers a.nd now staggered
under the burden of tremendous public debts.

A large per

centage of the merchant shipping of the world had been des
troyed by Germany1s unrestricted use of submarine warfare.
The total wealth expended in prosecuting the war was almost
unbelievable to the people of that day, but the human misery
caused by the war was even greater than the material damage.
Millions of young men had been killed and millions more had
been crippled for life.

As a further consequence of the

war, there were thousands upon thousands of widows and or
phans who had to be partly or wholly supported by their
governments.

The question naturally arose:

to pay for all this death and destruction?
naturally given was:

Germany.

who Is going
The answer as

In the view of the Allies,

Germany alone was responsible for the xvar.-^

All the suf

fering and destruction had been caused by Germany*s unpro
voked attack upon helpless Belgium and then upon France.

^■R. B. lucCallum, Public Opinion and the Last^Peace
(London: Oxford University Press, T^TjlyTi p 0 . lOk-105".
Tardieu, op. cit., pp. 1-26, rehearsed German militarism
as far back as iBfi.B. He had no doubt of Germany* s war
guilt.

How much Germany should pay, how much she could, pay, and
how these payments should be divided among the Allies were
subjects which demanded a tremendous amount of study and
debate at the Peace Conference.

Indeed, r,the subject of

reparations caused more trouble, contention, hard feeling
and delay at the Peace Conference than any other point of
the Treaty of Versailles.,f^

Although General Smuts was

not assigned to the Reparations Commission of the Confer
ence, he exerted an important influence on the final claims
presented to Germany.

To understand that influence, the

development of the reparations clauses of the treaty must
be at least partially traced.
The Idea of demanding reparations from s. defeated
enemy was not invented at Paris In 1919a it is as old. as
war itself.

Whereas reparations were once collected by

means of loot and pillage and the annexation of conquered
territory, by.the nineteenth century, a money payment was
usually demanded of the vanquished by the victor.

The most

recent example before the negotiators of 1919 v/as Prussia 1 s
exaction of an indemnity from Prance In 1 8 7 1 which far exthe total cost of the Franco-Prussian

w a r .

3

From the

earliest days of the 19l)j--19l3 war, both the Allies and
Q
Thomas William Lamont, Reparations,:I House and
Seymour, op. cit., P . 259•
3hloyd George, Peace Treaties, I, )i39*

the Central Powers had thought of reparations as part of
any final settlement.

The German Chancellor Bethmann-

Hollweg admitted, in a speech in the Reichstag on August
I}., 191^!-, that Germany had wronged Belgium and stated that
the Imperial government would seek to make good that wrong
as soon as Germany1s military objectives had been attained.1
A few months later, Prime Minister Herbert Asquith promised
that Great Britain would never u *sheathe the sword . . .
until Belgium recovers in full measure all and more than
all that she has sacrificed.'

As the war continued and

damage and destruction mounted, two distinct attitudes de
veloped among the Allies with regard to how much Germany
was to pay in the event of an Allied victory.

The French

were In the forefront of those who thought Germany should
pay for the entire costs of the war.

On the other hand,

President Wilson led the Americans In advocating that
Germany should pay only for material damage caused by the
war.^
When the Germans began negotiating for an armis
tice in October 1 9 1 8 , they specifically accepted as a

^-'Philip Mason Burnett, Reparation at the Paris
Peace Conference from the Standpoint of the American
Del egat ion (2 vo'ls. ; Hew~York; Columbia University
Press, 19^0) , I, 35k-*
^Lloyd George, Peace Treaties, I, J±1]D.
^R. S. Baker, op. cit., II, 368 -6 9 .

71
basis fop peace negotiations Wilson* s f o u r t e e n pointsj
given in an address to Congress on January 3, 1913, and
bis subsequent speeches, especially the one of September
27, 1 9 1 6 .'

The only references to reparations in Wilson*s

fourteen points were the statements in points VII, VIII,
and XI that Belgium, France, Rumania, Serbia, and Monte
negro should be 11evacuated and restored.11^
month Wilson added his famous statement:

The following
”There shall be

no annexations, no contributions, no punitive damages,”9
These then Yiere Wilson*s rather vague and somewhat contra
dictory pronouncements on reparations which the Germans
wished to accept as the basis of a peace settlement.

It

was necessary, of course, for all the Allies to agree to
this basis before the negotiations for an armistice could
proceed.

Accordingly, representatives of the Allied and

Associated Powers met In Paris on October 2 9 , 1913*

There

they agreed to accept the fourteen points provided that
the reparations statements were clarified.-^

Therefore,

^Burnett, op. cit., I, 330-81; U.S., Department of
State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the
United States, 1 9 1 3 ^i^T^ment' 1 (2 vols.j Washington:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1933), I, 337-33. Cited
hereafter as For. Reis, of U.S., 1913, Supp. 1 .
Q

U.S., Congressional Record, 65th Cong., 2d Sess,,
1913, LVI, Part 1, 681.

9u.S., Congressional Record, 65th Cong., 2d Sess.,
1913, LVI, Part 2'/1 9 3 7 1 9 5 2 “.
^ L l o y d George, Peace Treaties, I, jhr-3$.
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when the final note of November 5>, the Lansing ITote, was
communicated to Germany, it contained the following statement:
Further, in the conditions of peace laid down
in his address to Congress of January 8 , 1913, the
President declared that invaded territories must
be restored as well as evacuated and freed, the
Allied Governments feel that no doubt ought to be
allowed to exist as to what this provision implies.
By it they understand that compensation will be
made by Germany for all damage done to the civilian
population of the Allies and their property by the
aggression of Germany by land, by sea, and from
the air.-^The above statement made by the Allies and accepted
by Germany thus constituted the basis for the reparation
discussions at the Peace Conference.

Note that it was

restricted to damage to the civilian population only.
Nevertheless, between the Armistice and the Conference,
French public opinion and the French press continued their
demands for total reparation of war costs.

The French

Parliament hesitated to pass tax bills in the hope that
payments from Germany would balance the French budget.-*-^
In Great Britain Lloyd George called for a general elec
tion in December 1913 in order to obtain a "mandate” from
the people for making the peace.-**3

in the election

See
1 2 Ibid., I, 9.

^ L l o y d George, Peace Treaties, I, 157-59
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campaign, the Prime Minister was careful to point out that
reparations would have to be limited by Germany1s capacity
to pay, vdaich would certainly be less than the public was
hoping for.

On the other hand, other campaigners were not

so careful, and British public opinion was certainly aroused
to hope that their own tax burdens would be eased by a
heavy contribution from G e r m a n y . I n contrast to public
opinion In Prance and Great Britain, there was never any
demand for a large indemnity in the United States, which
had suffered but slightly In comparison with the European
A l l i e s . W i t h such various public opinions influencing
the delegates, it was Inevitable that a clash on repara
tions would occur at the Conference.
At the plenary session of January 25 a Commission
on the Reparation of Damage was appointed.

It was instructed

to examine and report on how much the enemy countries ought
to pay in reparations, on what they were capable of paying,
1A
and on how and when payment should be made.
The first
1!

oLloyd George, Peace Treaties, I, I1 6 2 -6 9 . See
also ITicolson, op. cit., p p . 19-2IT* Tillman, op. cit.,
pp. 62-65; BIrdsall, op. cit. 9 pp. 3 6 -b.O. Keynes, op. cit.>
pp. 136-L.5? wrote a lurid account of this election. It
naturally made a deeper Impression than the more conser
vative accounts of others.
15
^Burnett, op. cit., I, 13#
For. Reis, of U.S., Peace Conference, III, 202,
205-206. The American delegates on the Reparations Com
mission were Bernard M. Baruch, I'Tornan H. Davis, Vance C.
McCormick, and later Thomas 7I. Lamont, with John Foster

task of the Commission, which began to meet on February 5,
was to decide on the general principles to be followed in
demanding reparations from the defeated enemy.

To this

end each delegation was asked to file a statement of prin
ciple s.17

When the statements were compared, it was found

that every delegation except that of the United States
believed that Germany should pay for the entire cost of
the war.l^
The first major debate in the Commission then be
gan over the inclusion of war costs.

The American delega

tion, often through it s brilliant young legal advisor,
John Foster-Dulles, argued that the wording of the Lan
sing note accepted by both Germany and the Allies could
not possibly be construed to cover remuneration for war
costs.^

On the other hand, the argument for including

Dulles as legal advisor. The French delegates were LouisLucien Klotz, Albert-Francois Lebrun, and Louis Loucheur.
Great Britain was represented by Prime Minister William
M. Hughes of Australia, Lord Cunliffe, and Lord Sumner.
(In spite of Lloyd George's protestations of moderation,
he appointed to the Reparations Commission men whom he
knew were in favor of exacting a large sum from Germany.)
Other states represented on the Commission were Belgium,
Greece, Poland, Portugal, Italy, Japan, Rumania, Serbia,
and Czechoslovakia. Burnett, op. cit., I, 13, II, 230-31.
17 Bernard M. Baruch, The Making of the Reparation
and Economic Sections of the Treaty (hew York: Ilarper £:
Brothers', 1920)', p7 TcT. Cited hereafter as Reparation.
"^Burnett, op. cit., I, 20, II, 313-17*
^Ibid. , I, 3*70-75; Baruch, Reparation, p. 20.
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such, costs was advanced vigorously by the British delegation.
This was a natural position for the British to take, for if
reparation was limited to physical damage only, the continen
tal countries would receive the lionTs share, whereas Britain
and the dominions would receive almost

n
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.

^0

France,

Italy, Serbia, and Japan followed the British lead.^*

Only

Belgium argued that to demand a large total from an emeny
unable to pay it all would reduce proportionately the claims
of those countries which had suffered the most material dam
age.

Thus Belgium was for excluding war costs, that is,

for all other countries.

Belgium* s right to reparation for

such costs had been recognized, by the Allies because the
invasion of Belgium had been a breach of international l a w . ^
After weeks of argument it became clear that the
delegates on the Reparations Commission were never going to
come to a decision by themselves.

It v/as decided., there

fore, to refer the matter to the Supreme Council.

At that

time President Wilson was en route to the United States,
so a long message was dispatched to him explaining the di
lemma and asking his advice.

20

The President sent back his

Baruch, Reparation, pn. 20-21; Burnett, op. cit.,

X, 553-57.
21rbid., I, 5 3 9 -9 1 , IX, 330-31; Baruch, Reparation,
pp.

31U - 2 2 .

^Burnett, op. cit., II, 32k-26; For. Reis, of U.S.,
1913, Supp. 1 , I, k09; Seymour, op. cit., I V , 196 '.

76
approval of the stand of the American delegation, saying
in part that the inclusion of war costs nis clearly incon
sistent with, what we deliberately led the enemy to expect
and cannot now honorably alter simply because we have the
power."

With WilsonTs support the American delegates in

informal conferences were able to persuade Lloyd George,
Clemenceau, and Orlando to accept the American point of
view on the exclusion of war costs.^*

It must be said,

however, that it was not Wilson*s stand alone that decided
the issue.

The French delegates soon realized, as had the

Belgians earlier, that the exclusion of war costs was to
the advantage of France if Germany could not pay all that
was morally her duty to p a y . ^

Another significant factor

was the concession on theoretical responsibility advanced
by Dulles.

He suggested that a clause be Inserted in the

treaty saying that Germany was in principle liable for the
whole cost of the war, but, due to her inability to pay it
all, a lesser amount would be demanded.

This became Article

231, the "war guiltIT clause of the Versailles Treaty, which

^Burnett, op. cit., I, 6 lk.
^Baruch, Reparation, p. 26.
^Burnett, op. cit., I, 2^-26; Tardieu, 0 0 . cit.,
pp. 291-92. With war costs Included France would he.ve re
ceived 2l_ip, the British Empire, kO/S, Belgium, 1.7p, and the
United States, 2S% of the total reparations. With war costs
excluded the percentages would have been France, l'-3L, the
British Empire, 19u* Belgium, 2h$, and the United States,
less than 1%. Baruch, Reparation, pp. 21-22.

was so hated by the Germans and so exploited by Hitler.
The next major debate in the Reparations Commission
was over the categories of reparation to be demanded from
(Germany.

Each delegation submitted a memorandum on the

subject to a special sub-committee of the Commission.

The

memoranda were then consolidated into one list of thirtyone categories, which were gradually reduced to ten.

On

these ten categories there was general agreement except
for the inclusion of pensions and separation allowances.^7
The British and French delegations particularly urged the
inclusion of pensions and allowances.

With the rejection

of war costs, the British had to find sonic formula that
would assure Great Britain and the dominions a fair share
in the reparations payments.^

Prance also had a tremen

dous pension burden which the French hoped to transfer to
Germany.^9

Again the delegates from the United States

opposed their European Allies on the grounds that pensions
and allowances were part of war costs and not an item of

^°Burnett, op. cit., I, 26-27 5 600; Tardieu, on. cit
p. 293; For. Reis, of U.S., Peace Conference, XIII, 1|-19•
^Baruch, Reparation, p. 2 6 , 32-3);.; Burnett, op. cit
II, 391-k23 9 I.j.26-32. rfBy separation allowances is meant pay
b^r the governments to families and relatives who normally
depended for their support upon persons in military service.
Baruch, Reparation, p. 26, note.
^ L l o y d George, Peace Treaties, I, )p91.
^9(pardieu, op. cit., p. 292.
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Lord Sumner prepared a lengthy exposi

tion of the British viev/point, which he read to the Ameri
can delegation on March 27#

He argued for the inclusion

of pensions and separation allowances on the grounds that
the soldier is 11simply a civilian called to arms in the
cause of justice; his uniform makes no difference. . . .

I

think that history will not find In his case anything to
deprive him of civilian rights.”31

President Wilson re

jected Lord Sumner1s arguunents as being too legalistic.
It was then that Lloyd George asked General Smuts, whom
the President greatly admired, to give his opinion on the
*2 O

subject.

On March 31* 1919* ln a short, clear, well-written
paper, Smuts supported the inclusion of pensions and sep
aration allowances.

He took as his starting point the

reservation of the Allies in the Lansing note.

The Ger

mans, by accepting this note,
. . . acknowledged their liability to compensation
for all damage to the civilian population or their
property wherever and however arising, so long as
it was the result of German aggression. The Presi
dent’s limitation to restoration of the invaded
territories only of some of the Allies was clearly
abandoned.
Smuts then explained his understanding of the phrase

3^Burnett, op. cit., I, 753-62*
3 1 Xbid., I, 722-23.
3 2 Ibld., I, 6 3 .
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"civilian population" not by any legalistic on involved
reasoning but by a simple example*
A shop keeper in a village in northern France lost
his shop through enemy bombardment, and was himself
badly wounded. He would be entitled as one of the
civilian population to compensation for the loss of
his property and for his personal disablement* He
subsequently recovered completely, was called up for
military service, and after being badly wounded and
spending some time in the hospitals was discharged as
permanently unfit. The expense he was to the French
Government during this period as a soldier (his pay
and maintenance, Inis uniform, rifle, ammunition, his
keep in hospital, etc.) was not damage to a civilian,
but military loss to his Government, and it is there
fore arguable that the French Government cannot recover
compensation for such expense Linder the above reserva
tion. His wife, however, was during this period deprived
of her bread-winner, and she therefore suffered damage
as a member of the civilian population, for which she
would be entitled to compensation. In other words the
separation allowances paid to her and her children
during this period by the French Government would have
to be made good by the German Government, as the com
pensation which the allowances represent was their
liability. After the soldier1s discharge as unfit, he
rejoins the civilian population, and as for the future
he cannot (in whole or in part) earn his own livelihood,
he is suffering damage as a member of the civilian popu
lation, for which the German Government are again liable
to make compensation. In other words the pension for
disablement which he draws from the French Government
is really a liability of the German Government, which
they must under the above reservation make good to the
French Government. It could not be argued that as he
was disabled while a soldier he does not suffer damage
as a civilian after his discharge If he is unfit to
do his ordinary work. He does literally suffer as
Q.J civilian after his discharge, and his pension Is
intended to make good this damage, and is therefore a
liability of the German Government. If he had been
killed on active service, his wife as a civilian would
have been totally deprived of her bread-winner, and
would be entitled to compensation. In other words the
pension she would draw from the French Government would
really be a liability of the German Government under the
above reservation, and would have to be made good by
them to the French Government.
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He concluded his argument "by saying:
The plain, coirmonsense construction of the reser
vation therefore, leads to the conclusion that . . .
disablement pensions to discharged soldiers, or pen
sions to widows and. orphans or separation allowances
paid to their wives and children during the period
of their military service are all items representing
compensation to members of the civilian population
for damage sustained by them, for which the German
Government are liable.33
Smuts »s argument was not very different from Sum
ner's, but it was of vastly greater importance because it
persuaded President Wilson to allow the inclusion of pen
sions in the reparations demanded of Germany.

Lloyd George

said, "General Smuts was recognized to be a man of tolerant
views, detached from the intensities of European feeling
about the Germans, and in consequence his conclusions on
this matter carried great weight."^!-

Baruch said that

Smuts was well-known as "one of the most liberal and cou
rageous men at the Peace Conference" and that his note
won the "unanimous consent of . . . the Big

P o u r .

"35

According to Hancock, Smuts1s memorandum on
reparations did "more damage to his reputation than any-

^Burnett, o p . cit., I, 773-75.
Reparation, pp. 29-32.

dee also Baruch,

^ L l o y d George, Peace Treaties, I, b_96-97*
also Burnett, op. cit., I, 775-78.

35Baruch, Reparation, p. 29.

See

See also Tillman,

thing else lie over wrote."36

Keynes called It a nnastop-

piece of tlie sophist’s art,"37 and Baruch later agreed with
this indictment•33
Keynes’s statement.

On the other hand, Dulles challenged
He said that, although he had himself

concluded that pensions and separation allowances were not
chargeable to Germany,
. . . many people whose intellect and sincerity
command the confidence of the world reached a
contrary conclusion. . . . Whatever one’s personal
views may be, anyone who considers this subject In
a spirit of fairness can hardly deal In a contemp
tuous and offhand way with the sincere and. reasoned
judgment of men such as General Smuts.39
Another writer said soon after the Peace Conference:
It is of interest to observe that the most
generally assailed provision In the treaty, that
making Germany responsible for pensions and allow
ances, was proposed by General Smuts, whom no one can
accuse of vindictiveness towards Germany. While there
were many who condemned the policy of including pen
sions In reparation, and it Is unquestionably the
largest financial item In Germany’s Indebtedness, it
is also well not to forget t^iat there wore some highminded men who supported it.'-'-O
Smuts gave this explanation of his stand on
36

Hancock, op. cit. , p. j?l5.

-^Keynes, op. cit., p. 5>3*
•^Baruch, Public Years, p. 10,9*
39p;tienne Kantoux, The Carthaginian Peace or the
geo nomic Con sentiences of MrT Keynes' '(Hew York': Chari e s'
Scribner’s Sons, 19^2), p* 101, note.
'■‘^Temperley, op. cit. , II, 1)l. That Smuts "pro
posed 11 the inclusion of pensions and allowances is, of
course, not true; he merely supported the inclusion
proposed by others.
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reparations to the South. African Parliament f our years after
the Peace Conference.
nBoth in the British Empire delegation and out of it
in other sections I used every scrap of such influ
ence as I possessed to get the reparation figures
down to a fair moderate fixed amount. It is perfectly
well known to those who took part in the conference
that I was probably the most active protagonist at
the conference for fixing the reparation amount at
a reasonably low figure. I Incurred odium and obloquy
at the conference because of the energy with which I
pushed my view on the dangerous subject. The view I
consistently advocated was that, whether pensions were
or were not Included--IndeeG, whatsoever items or valu
ations of damage were accepted as between the Allies—
as regards the Germans the amount due whould be defi
nitely fixed in the Peace Treaty, and that it should
be such as Germany could reasonably pay without dis
location of her economic life. Unfortunately this
view did not prevail. The actual result of the repara
tion procedure has been brought about against my ad
vice, and in the teeth of my strongest opposition, and
I disclaim all responsibility for the result.
He.also said that if he had known so much would depend on
his opinion, he would not have given it so readily.
!,I assumed at the time . . . that I was only one
of the many who were giving opinions about reparations.
. . . There was the feeling among the more moderate
delegates that Germany v/ould pay no more than a fixed
amount; that what faced us now was only a matter of
distributing this fixed amount; and that T1clvlllan
damageslt could be interpreted either narrowly or
•widely, but a narrow Interpretation would give Prance
and Belgium almost everything and England almost
nothing and a wide interpretation would result in a
just <awapd.,,l2

^--4-IIllin, op. cit., II, 205>-206. On
Smuts suggested that
000,000,000 might be
total reparation figure, although he thought
was nrobably not high enough* Lloyd George,
1 , >93.
■I.Ii11 in, op. cit., II, 207.

June 1, 1 9 1 9 *
fixed as the
that figure
Pea.ce Treaties,
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Smuts*s son gave a similar explanation:
My Tatlier!s point in insisting on the inclusion
of allowances and pensions was to ensure that the
war-ravished countries of Europe did not get the
lion* s share while financially exhausted Engle-nd
was left in the cold. It was only later when Prance
swelled her reparation amount to fantastic proportions,
my father said, that it became not only a farce but
tTone of those things that are responsible for the
Germany of today. T,d-3
It can be seen that Smuts believed at the time that
Germany* s liability for reparations would be stated In the
treaty as a definite, fixed sum.

Wilson believed the same,

nBoth Wilson and Smuts . . . were almost certainly con
vinced at the time that they were making a decision as to
the distribution of a fixed sum and not as to the size of
that sum,

Smuts *s memorandum on pensions was his sole

contribution to the reparations section of the treaty.
Lloyd George later asked him to serve on the Commission on
Austrian Reparations, but he refused.^

^Smuts, Jr., op. cit., p. 207*
'■^Tillman, op. cit. , p. 2k6. Thomas A. Bailey,
Woodrow Wilson and the Lost Peace, In Wilson and the Peace
makers (hew York: Macrmllan Co.,’ 19l<-7T> PP* 2lL0-k3, con-"
tended that the decision to include pensions was morally
wrong, because against the spirit if not the letter of the
pre-Armistice agreements. He agreed, however, that Wilson,
as well as Smuts, was sure a moderate fixed sum would be
included in the treaty. Wilson was opposing Prance on
everything and perhaps thought he should give in on some
thing which he thought at the time was of minor importance.
Birdsall, op. cit., p. 2jl, agreed generally with Bailey.
‘k^Millin, op. cit., II, 211-lIt; Hancock, on. cit.,
p p .
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Had a fixed sum of moderate proportions been decided
upon at Paris, Germany might have paid, and the effect which
Smuts desired might have taken place, with Britain receiving
a share in reparations in proportion to her contribution to
the war.

As it actually happened, after weeks of debate and

deliberation, the Allies failed to decide upon either a
fixed sum to demand of Germany or a definite time limit in
which to collect it. )i
•A

The final solution was to write into

the treaty a provision for a Reparation Commission to settle
all such matters.

The Commission in 1 9 2 1 set the sum to be

paid by Germany at approximately §335 000,000,000, about
two-thirds of which was for pensions and allowances,^
sum was never paid.

This

It was scaled down by the Dawes Plan

and the Young Plan and finally canceled altogether in 1932.
Because of foreign loans to Germany in the meantime, mostly
from the United States, Germany actually made a profit out
of the reparations scheme.

That Germany could not pay was

disproved by the vast sums Hitler spent on armaments In the
years immediately after the ending of reparations.

Repara

tions were not paid because Germany, as was quite natural,
did not 7/ant to pay them. Itft

^ F o r . Reis, of U.S., Peace Conference, V, 19-33,
^Bailey, op. cit., p. RliO.
^Llantoux, op. cit., pp.

133-55* 15&.

CHAPTER V I

SMUTS AND THE MI SSI 01-7 TO HUNGARY
’
iVh.ile the representatives of the victorious na
tions were pondering in Paris over the future fate of
Europe, events were occurring in central Europe which
they could not ignore.

One series of events was impor

tant to the story of Smuts in 1 9 1 9 for it was to take him
away from Paris on a diplomatic mission to Hungary.
An armistice had been concluded on November 3*
1913, between the representatives of the Italian Supreme
Command and the Supreme Command of what still called it
self the Austro-Hungarian Army, even though. there was no
longer in fact an Austro-Hungarian Empire.-*-

The Poles,

Czechs, Yugo-Slavs, and Magyars had all declared their
independence of Habsburg power and had set up Independent
states.

Less than a week before the armistice, 011 Octo

ber 31 i Count Michael Karolyi had been entrusted with
forming a government for Hungary which was to be linked
with Austria only by a common monarch.

p

Then on November

iTemperley, op. cit., I, 351* For the text of
this armistice see For. Reis, of U.S., Peace Conference,
II, 175-32 and Francis Deal:, Hungary at the Paris Peace
Conference (New York: Columbia Uni"versity— Press", I9 E 2T ,
---- |gTT
PP. 3p p -5'-».
2

Ibid., pp. 7-3; Denis Sinor, History of Hungary
(London: G-eorge Allen & Unwin, 3-959) > P • 232.

11 Charles IV, the last Habsburg emperor, relinquished the
Austrian throne, and on November 13 he did the same with
the Hungarian throne.

On November l 6 the Hungarian People 1

Republic was proclaimed with Karolyi as Premier. ^
Because the November 3 armistice had treated
Austria-Hungary as a single entity, it was necessary for
the Allies to draw up a military convention to regulate
conditions under which the terms of the armistice were to
be applied to Hungary; it was signed at Belgrade on Novem
ber 13 9 1913.

This convention provided for the occupation

of a specified zone of Hungarian territory, the right to
extend that occupation wherever it might be thought neces
sary, and the demobilization of almost all of the Hungarian
forces,^
As the convention of November 13 did not draw
definite lines of demarcation along the entire EumanianHungarian border, friction soon developed between the
troops of the two countries.

Rumania protested to the

Paris Conference that Hungarian forces were terrorizing
the Rumanian parts of Hungary which they still occupied.

^Deak, op. cit., p. J 9 note; Emil Lengyel, 1,000
Years of Hun,gar?/ (New York: The John Day Company, Top^Tj
pp. 195-96 •
^'Temperley, op. cit., I, 352* IV, Ip3-59J Deak,
op. cit., pp. 10-11. For the text of this military con
vention see For. Reis, of U.S., Peace Conference, II,
133-35 and Peak, op. cit., up. 3 5 9 -6 1 .
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As a result, in February of 1919 > General Franchet d*Esperey,
C ommander-in-Chief of the allied forces In southeast Europe,
proposed and the Conference agreed to set a more definite
line of demarcation and to provide a neutral, unoccupied
zone between the Rumanian and Hungarian troops.5

Colonel

Vlx, the French officer at the head of the military mission
In Budapest, accompanied by representatives, both official
and unofficial, of all the Allies, presented, this plan to
Count Karolyi and his government on March 19*

Captain

Nicholas Roosevelt, the unofficial American representative,
reported, the scene to the Conference.

According to Roose

velt, Karolyi interpreted the note to mean that the Ru
manians were to advance one hundned kilometers Into Hun
garian territory while the Hungarians withdrew two hundred
kilometers.

He declared that any government which accepted

such a plan would not last a d.ay.

Furthermore, If the note

were signed, the communists In Hungary would Increase from
a few thousand, to two hundred thousand, or more.

For all
A
these reasons he could not possibly agree to the plan.
Colonel Vix, and the note itself, made It clear that the
lines established, by the note were only temporary military
lines for keeping the peace and. had nothing to do with the

^Temperley, on. cit., I, 353* IV, 159* For the
text of this note see For. Reis, of U.S., Peace Conference,
IV, 1?l5-6-6, 157-53.
6 Ibxd., XII, kl3-l6.
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final political boundaries, which would be decided later.
Karolyi chose to disbelieve these assurances because the
lines closely followed the ethnic boundaries between Ru
manians and Hungarians.

He was certain that the Allies

had already decided upon the boundaries for his country.7
Karolyi, refusing to accept the Allies 1demarcation plan,
resigned his office on March 21 and handed, over the gov
ernment to a group of People*s Commissars, whose first
q
action was to declare
Hungary a Soviet Republic . 0
The leader of

the new government was Bela Kun, who

was admirably equipped for his job.

He ha.d been an in

structor in a university before the war, then an officer
in the Austro-Hungarian army.

He was captured by the

Russians in 1915 a^d had remained in Russia imbibing com
munist doctrine until the revolution.

Under Kerensky he

became the head of a bureau of propaganda and later came
into contact with both Trot3Icy and Lenin.
ended, he returned to

When the war

Hungary to preach communismamong

disaffected soldiers and idle

workmen.

In time he was ar

rested. by Karolyi*s government and remained In prison until
Karolyi*s resignation.

Immediately upon the fall of the

Karolyi government, Bela Kun was released from prison and

^Temper ley, op. cit., I, 353* IV, 159 5 Ron. Reis.
of U.S., Peace Conference, XII, kl7•
^Sinor, on. cit., p. 233; Deak, on. cit., p. 57.
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made People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs, and "became
the idol of the Budapest

p r o l e t a r i a t . "9

The new communist ministers openly proclaimed their
desire to further the domination of the proletariat by
every means at their disposal.

They also announced that

they had made an alliance Y/ith the Soviet government of
Moscow.3-0

The revolution, however, had. been bloodless and

was interpreted by Captain Roosevelt as having been pri
marily the result of national feeling.

The Hungarians did

not want their country further decreased in size and v«rere
willing to accept communism to prevent such a disaster.
Roosevelt believed the Hungarian revolution v/as very impor
tant because it represented open defiance to the first
major public decision of the Paris Conference with regard
to one of the Central Powers; the encouragement this action
would give to Germany might prove disastrous.
Bela Kun naturally was eager to have his government
recognised by the victorious Allies.

Consequently, only

three days after coming to power, he delivered a note to
the Peace Conference in Paris by vj-ay of the Italian minister
in Belgrade.

The note was read to the Council of Four by

^Ualbone W. Graham, Jr., assisted by Robert C.
Binkley, ITev/ Governments of Central Europe (Nev: York:
Henry Holt and Company, 1926), pp. 215-19•
■^Temperley, on. cit., I, 353.
^For. Reis, of U.S., Peace Conference, XII, klb-19.
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Orlando on March. 29.

The message declared that the new

government of Hungary accepted the armistice of November 3 9
1 9 lo, and did not think that the rejection of the Vix note

had infringed that agreement.

Further, the alliance with

Russia was not a formal alliance but merely an entente
cordial©* Hungary wished to live in peace with her neigh
bors and the western Allies.

The note continued:

The Hungarian Socialist Party has been driven by
the force of the events to take hold of the executive
power. It wishes to organize a new social State, a
State in which every man will live of his own work,
but this social State will not be hostile to other
Nations. It wishes on the contrary to co-operate
for the great human solidarity.
Furthermore, Hungary was ready to ^negotiate territorial
questions on the basis of the principle of self-determina
tion of the People.”

The note concluded by saying that

the government of Hungary
. . . would, gladly welcome a civil and. diplomatic
mission of the Entente in Ehxdapest and would guarantee
to it the right of extraterritoriality and undertake
to provide for its absolute safety.^
After the Big Four heard Kunfs message, ”a proposal
was made that, without sending a formal diplomatic mission,
some discreet and confidential person should be sent to
ascertain the real position.”

Lloyd George at once suggested

General Smuts for the mission . ^

Y/ith a party of fourteen

~^~^For. Reis, of J.S., Peace Conference, V, 13.
^^Ibid., V, lo. The minutes of this meeting record
that no final decision concerning the mission or the person
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Smuts left Pauls the evening of April 1 ,

His instructions

were:
• . . to examine the general working of the Armis
tice of November 3rd, 1913; the Llilitary Convention
of November 13th, 1913; the stasis of the new govern
ment; economic conditions; and, in particular, the
arrangements about the neutral zone. He was to ex
plain to the Hungarian Government that this zone had
only the purpose of stopping bloodshed: it would
not affect the eventual disposition of boundaries
■under the Peace Treaty; and he was himself to make
the adjustments he thought desirable in the present
boundaries,
He was further to investigate the progress of
Bolshevism, and, in general, for the purposes of his
mission, to go wherever he chose in Hungary, and do
anything, 1 ^The following morning Harold Nicolson, a young
British diplomat in the party, had a long talk with Smuts
in which he gained the impression that the real idea back
of the mission was nto see whether Bela Kun is worth using
as a vehicle for getting into touch with Moscow.”1^

Years

later Smuts denied, that there was any such hidden purpose
behind the trip.

Nevertheless, his biographer said:

If anyone, In those days, saw In Smuts 1 mind the
thought of Moscow it was with good reason. He had
Moscow on the brain: he saw everywhere, and par
ticularly In the future, the red hand, of Moscow;
even his pleas on behalf of Germany v/ere largely
grounded In his fear of Moscow. It must have been

to head it was made at that time. The matter was to be
discussed again on March 31? "but the next minutes are for
a meeting on April 5 after Smuts had left for Hungary.
1 11

Mvlillin, op. cit. , j_I, lb7*
id

^Nicolson, op. cit., p. 293*
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with, the feeling of going to see an ugly fascinating
sight that he was now on his j£[ay to roaice contact with
an actual Soviet Government.
The morning of April 3 the party arrived in Vienna*
Uicolson recorded the pinched, yellow look of the fatstarved people and the unkempt, littered appearance of the
once-gay city.

They were met at the British Embassy by

Sir Thomas Cunninghame, head of the military mission there,
to whom Smuts took an instant dislike.

Cunninghame took

them to lunch at Sachers, where they were served a huge
and expensive meal.

Smuts was furious and. dressed Cunning

hame down for his “’gross error in taste. Tf1

He decreed

that from then on his party would eat only their own army
rations and would take nothing from the starving countries
they were visiting.

The youthful Nicolson added, MIt was

a good luncheon all the same.'1^
On the morning of April It the party arrived in
Budapest, which looked even sadder and more bedraggled
than Vienna.

Smuts decided that the entire party would

remain on the train; they would not enter the city.

Ac

cordingly, Bela Kun was sent for and came to the train,
not once, but three times that day to confer v/ith Smuts.
Uicolson described him as:
A little man of about 30:

puffy white face and

op. cit., II, 133.
^Alieolson, op. ci t ., pp. 293 -9-!-»

loose wet lips:
sliaven head:
impression of red
hair:
shifty suspicious eyes: . . . the face of
a sulky and uncertain criminal.
Smuts talked with this unprepossessing individual "as if
he were talking to the Duke of Albercorn:

friendly, cour

teous hut not a touch of any surrender of his own tremendou
dignity."-*-9

The only result of that day* s negotiations was

that Bela liun signed a paper promising to release all Brit
ish subjects whom he had Imprisoned * 2 ^1
Throughout the day and evening Smuts had several
visitors besides Kun.

Professor Brown, "one of President

Wilson*s *enquirers,1n took a "Wilsonian," that is, an
"unpractical view" of the situation.

He spoke of the good

ord.er Kun was maintaining and of the need for "*natural
social evolution.1"2^

In contrast, the Spanish and Swiss

Consuls told Smuts that Kun had not shown moderation; the
prisons were packed with people.

"They confirm what every

body says, namely, that Bela Kun is just an incident and
not worth treating seriously. " 2 2
Before the long day ended, Smuts telegraphed a re
port to Paris.

He had explained fully to Kim, he reported,

^Hicolson, op. cit.,
1 9 Ibid., p. 3 0 1 .
2 QIbid., p. 301.
2 1 Ibid., p. 297.
2 2 Ibid., pp. 3 0 1 -3 0 2 .

p. 2 9 6 .
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that the line suggested by Colonel Vix was not to be a
permanent political frontier but was only to maintain
peace and order.

Kun gave two reasons why he could not

order the Hungarian troops to retire behind, the proposed
line.

First, to do so would cause his government to fall

even as the mere demand had caused Karolyi!s to fall.
Second, such an order would not be obeyed as he had little
hold over the troops occupying the territory In question.
Bela Kun further said that if his government fell, chaos
would result as no other party Y/as capable of forming a
government.

Kun added that if the Allies insisted on

their present policy, they would have to come and run
Hungary themselves.

Smuts further reported that Bela Kun

had made a counter-proposal of his own.

He suggested that

representatives of the Hungarian, German, Austrian, Bohe
mian, Serbian, and Rumanian governments should meet to
settle among themselves the whole question of their fron
tiers.

Furthermore, the economic position of the ney/

states might also be dealt with at the meeting, since, as
Kun said, the question of food was more Important at the
moment than frontiers.

Smuts concluded his report by

urging the acceptance of Kun*s suggestion.

Such a meeting

could be easily arranged, he thought, Inasmuch as most of
the nabions were already represented at Paris and delegates
from Hungary, Austria, and Germany would have to be called
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there in any event to sign the Peace

Treaty.

The next morning, April 5, Bela Kun returned to
Smuts*s train for more negotiations.

ITicolson recorded in

his diary:
Smuts hands him a draft agreement providing for
the occupation by the Great Powers of a neutral
zone between him and the Rumanians. If he agrees
to this we shall raise the blockade. It is clear
that Bela Kun longs to accept it. The signature
of such a document would imply official recognition
of his regime, which he desires passionately. But
he Is suspicious and afraid. Clasping the document
he leaves us--saying he must consult his Cabinet.
That means he must, consult Moscow. He promises us
a reply by seven.
At seven Kun d.uly returned with several comrades.

He agreed

to accept Smuts* s terms but added a clause of his own:

that

the Rumanian army was to withdraw behind, the Maros River;
that is, the line laid down in the military convention of
November 13*

"*No, gentlemen,*" Smuts said, "'there must

be no reservations.*"

He made a final appeal, to them to

accept his terms as being in their own best interests.

The

communists evidently expected Smuts to bargain further,
but he had come to the conclusion that Bela Kun was of no
importance and was not capable of giving effect to any
treaty.

As the Hungarians were still standing on the plat

form, Smuts gave the order for the train to start; it
pulled out of the station leaving some very astonished

^ For. Reis, of U.S., Peace Conference, V, kl-L;.3#
pj,
•Hicolson, op. c i t ., p. 302 .
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comrades staring after it.^5
Hicolson continued his account:

"We then dine.

Smuts is delightful, telling us stories of the Veldt with
a ring of deep homesickness in his voice.

A lovely man."2^

Smuts again telegraphed a report to Paris on the
day*s negotiations.

He described the line which he had

proposed as "running further east than Colonel Vix's line,
but nevertheless well to the west of the territory which
the Roumanian Committee of the Conference assigned to
Roumania in their Report."

The Hungarian officials, Smuts

reported, refused to accept this line as It would, in their
opinion, have resulted in civil war In the neutral zone and
the fall of their government.

Smuts had rejected the line

proposed by the Hungarians on the grounds that troaible with
Rumania would have immediately followed.

He was convinced,

that there was no hostility towards the great powers 011
the part of Bela Kunfs regime.

It was, however, weak and

would likely fall at an early date.

Smuts concluded that

the wisest course to follow would be "not to provoke a
conflict over the armistice terms which may be unnecessary,
but, after hearing the Hungarians'

statement in Paris or

some other place, to settle the final political frontiers."
Meanwhile, he recommended that the trainload of fats

2-%icolson, op. cit., pp. 3 0 3 -3 0 !’..
Ibid. , p. 30!l.
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already bought and paid for by the Hungarians should be
allowed to enter the country although the blockade itself
should not yet be lifted . ^
Smuts returned to Vienna and from there went to
Prague* where he had an hour-long private Interview with
President Thomas Masaryk.

The two men discussed the prob

lem of the boundaries to be established between Czecho
slovakia and. Hungary, although their discussion had no
po

effect on the final solution. °

They also discussed the

advisability of a conference of central European states
as suggested by Bela Kun.

Masaryk was In favor of some

sort of economic union between Hungary, Austria, and the
neighboring countries, supervised by the League of Nations.
Such a union, Masaryk thought, might be the saving of
Europe, and he was willing to participate In conferences
leading to that end.

Smuts also approved of some such

plan, seeing In It a variation of his mandates idea.^9
After seeing Masaryk, Smuts returned to Paris, by way of
Vienna, arriving there on April 9*
NIcolson concluded his account of the mission In
the following words:

^ For. Reis, of U.S., Peace Conference, V, 6l-62.
^°Ibid., IV, 6 6 9 ; Deak, op. cit., pp. 6 ’.;.-6 6 , K31-33;
NIcolson, op. cit., pp. 32Ll-2£.
^Millin, op. cit., II, l93-9^«
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The papers say that the Smuts mission has been
a ifiasco. 1 I think it was in a way, but then our
whole purpose was obscure and illogical. Yet we
have gained the following:
(1) A conviction that
Bela Kun and Hungarian Bolshevism Is not a serious
menace and cannot last.
(2) A valuable talk between
Smuts and Masaryk.
(3) A conviction that AustriaHungary i_s an economic ainit and that these trade
barriers are fatal, (k) negatively--Smnts refrained
from using Kun as a liaison with Moscow. His sense
and dignity were superb.30
Smuts also realized that the trip was not a diplo
matic t r i u m p h . 31

in fact, It is possible that the Immediate

effect of the mission was the opposite of what Smuts in
tended.

The recognition of the communist government in

Hungary by the Peace Conference, although not formally
stated, probably weakened conservatives and strengthened
revolutionaries throughout Europe.3^
Smuts espoused Kunfs suggestion for a conference
of the central European states and, back In Paris, tried
to Interest others in the Idea.

Colonel House and. President

Wilson were Interested, but the Italians were hostile, and
Lloyd George was Indifferent.

The conference was never

held.33
As for Bela Kun, he lasted longer than Smuts had

33,Nicoi_SOn, op. cit., p. 307.
3-^Bonsal, op. cit., p. 139*
3^For. Reis, of U.S., Peace Conference, XII,
J,Jrg-1 (.9 ; Deak, op. cit., pp. 62 '-6 3 '.
^Bonsai,

XI, 191!--

op. cit. ,

pp.

I>|.l-k2; TJillin, o^. ci t .,
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foreseen* While the Supreme Council of the Allies did
nothing, Kun built up an army and fought both the Czechs
and the Rumanians.

7/hen the Rumanians were within sight

of Budapest, which they occupied on August 8, 1 9 1 9 5 Bela
Kun fled to Russia.

There he dropped out of sight--a

victim of the purges of the thirties. 3k
Although diplomatically unsuccessful, the trip to
Hungary was for Smuts a refreshing interlude away from
the depressing atmosphere of Paris.35

Upon his return,

he njoined in the wrangling11 with the other delegates.^
His efforts after his return were largely directed toward
revising the terms of the nearly-completed treaty with
Germany.

^^Temperley, op. c i t ., I, 3?!'--57, IV, l6o-6l; Dealt,

op. cit., 103-lOb.; Lengyel, op. cit., p. 202.
3^Smuts, Jr., op. cit., p. 211.
3 Ivlillin, o p

.

cit., II, 19.);..

CHAPTER V I I

SMUTS Al-TD THE TREATY OP VERSAILLES
General Smuts worked as hard as anyone to defeat
Germany as long as the war continued, but, once the fight
ing stopped, he, almost alone, retained no bitterness
against the former enemy*

In fact, only two men at the

Peace Conference felt any genuine sympathy for the defeated
nation:

Smuts and his colleague, General Botha*

two, Smuts was by far the more vocal.-*-

Of the

In his opinion it

was Prussian militarism which had been the enemy--not the
German, people.

A few days after the Armistice, in pleading

the 111 sheer practical necessity * 11 of a League of Rations,
he said:
"How as we organised the world for victory,
let us organise it against hunger and unemployment.
Rot only the liberated territories of our Allies,
not only our small neutral neighbors, but the enemy
countries themselves, require our helping hand. Let
us extend it in all generosity and magnanimity•
Later, at the opening of the Conference he asked that Ger
many be treated with n *pity and restraint,* pointing out
that *civilization Is one body and we are all members of

■hyilllin, op. cit., II, 195>-9&; Kraus, op. cit.,
p. 272; Tillman, op. cit., p. 3^-7*
^Millin, op. cit., II, 156; Smuts, Jr., op. cit.,
p. 197; Crafford, op. cit., p. 133.
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one another*1”3

The words npity and restraint” expressed

Smuts1s ideals, from v/hich he never departed, as to the
spirit in which the peace should be made.

As the weeks

went by and. lesser ideals began to prevail at the Confer
ence, Smuts protested to everyone who would listen.

One

writer said, ”3y March he had already earned the reputation
of being not only a moralist but a gadfly into the bar
gain. 11^
Smuts based his pleas for Germany on two main prem
ises which he expressed in a letter to Lloyd George on
March 26.

The first was his own experience in South Africa.

My experience in South Africa has made me a firm
believer in political magnanimity, and your and
Campbell-Bannerman1s great record still remains
not only the noblest but also the most successful
page in recent British statesmanship^
The second was his fear of Russia and communism.

He sug

gested that, even though the enormity of their crimes ought
to be brought home to the German people, Germany should be
left strong enough to act as a bulwark against communism.

^Smuts, Jr., op. cit.,

p.

20o; Crafford,

op*

cit.,

P. 153.
^'Kraus, op. cit., p. 27li» Hancock, op. cit.,
pp. 5o3-5>09, recorded" that Smuts was absent from Paris from
February 15 to March 23 and was ill in London for most of
that time. There he brood.ed over the reports from Paris.
On his return, he intensified his campaign against the
treaty.
g
Ibid., p. 5>12. See also Millin, op. cit., II, 197>
2li-5>> 2 6 3 ; Lloyd George, Peace Treaties, 1 , 2$b; Crafford,
op
cit., p. 15J-I-; Kraus, op. cit., p. 270.
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The self-respect of the German people should also be built
up so that they might continue to believe in their own
civilization and reject that offered by Russia.

He summed

up his arguments this way:
1. We cannot destroy Germany Y/ithout destroying
Europe.
2. We cannot save Europe without the cooperation
of Germany. . . .
My fear Is that the Paris Conference may prove
one of the historic failures of the Yrorld.
Lloyd George was also d.Isturbed by the way the
treaty was developing; in fact, his vieYrs were very similar
to those expressed by Smuts.7

In order to clarify the

position of the British delegation, Lloyd George retired
from Paris for a few days with, some of his advisors, In
cluding General Smuts.^

The result of this conference was

the Fontainebleau memorandum, dated March 25.9

Although

this document was written in the first person as If It ex
pressed the views of Lloyd George only, It closely resem
bled some of the writings of Smuts both in language and
in ideas, particularly In the general opening statement.

6

Hancock, op. cit., pp. 510-12. See also Llillin,
op. cit., II, 1 9 6 -9 0 ; Smuts, Jr., op. cit., p. 206; Kraus,
., pp . 2 7 1 — (2.
^Hancock, op. cit., p. 513*
^Lloyd George, Peace Treaties, I, Il03.
^Ibid., I, Ip3lt.-l6. R. S. Baker, op. cit., III,
!ili9-57> printed part of this document but credited it to
General Tasker II. Bliss, one of the plenipotentiaries
from the United States.
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One memorable sentence of this document was quoted, by three
of his biographers as being Smuts* s ovm words:
You may strip Germany of her colonies, reduce her
armaments to a mere police force and her navy to
that of a fifth.-rs.te power; all the same in the
end if she feels that she has been unjustly treated
in the peace of 1 9 1 9 sl>-e will find means of exact
ing retribution from her conquerors,^
On May 6 the full text of the treaty with Germany
was assembled and presented to the delegates at a plenary
session of the Conference.^

The worst fears of Smuts and

other liberals were confirmed upon hearing
treaty.

the entire

During an early morning walk on May 7* Smuts and

Keynes met Herbert Hoover, who also thought the treaty was
too severe.

The three agreed that the "consequences of

many parts of the proposed Treaty would ultimately bring
destruction.11 They decided to work among their colleagues
in an attempt to have the treaty revised.-^
When the treaty was submitted to the German dele-

Lloyd George, Peace Treaties, I, Ll05; Crafford,
op. cit., pp. 153-5^; Smuts, Jr., op. cit., p. 206; Millin,
op. cit., II, 1 9 8 . Hancock, op. cit., pp. 5l3-lp* wrote
that Smuts was not present at Fontainebleau when this memo
was prepared. The fact that he wrote the letter quoted
above to Lloyd George on March 2 6 supports Hancock*s view.
On the other hand, Lloyd George named Smuts as the first
of the advisors he took with him. The fact that some of
the very words of the memo were credited to Smuts supports
the view that he did help prepare the document. Certainly,
it expressed his ideas.
11

For. Reis, of XT.S., Peace Conference, III, 33^-79*
Each delegate received a printed copy of the treaty.
^%Ioover, op. cit. , p. 2 3 lf.

gation on May 7* the head. or the delegation, Gount Brockdorff-Rantzau, read a prepared statement in which he said
that the German people could never admit that they alone
were guilty of* the war, although they admitted a degree of
guilt and a willingness to restore the territory of Bel
gium and France*

He recalled the ore-Amiistice agreement

and said that the German delegation 'would examine the
treaty in the light of that agreement*

Finally, he asked

that Germany be allowed to join the League of Hations at
once *-*-3

After the presentation of the treaty, Smuts inten
sified his efforts to have it revised*

In the middle of

May he told the British Empire delegation:
uIf the Germans are prepared to swallow this Treaty,
I still consider its provisions such as to make fu
ture peace and goodwill In Europe unlikely; • • •
the fires will be kept burning and the pot be kept
boiling until it again boils over, either in a new
war, or in the breakdown of the European system under
the onslaught of social and industrial anarchy.
A few days later he wrote identical letters to President
Wilson and Lloyd George asking each to use his M|power and
influence to make the final Treaty a more moderate and
reasonable document. 111

He criticized especially the

^ For* Reis* of U.S., Peace Conference, III, kl3-20
Lloyd George, Peace Treaties, 1 , 6'7"3>-B"2* R* S • Baker, op *
cit *, II, 500-50f>! Borden, op* cit*, II, 9 6 2 -6 3 .
^Mlllin, op. cit*, II, 2l£; Smuts, Jr., on. cit.,

p.

211

.
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territorial, reparation, and occupation clauses,

"’Under

this Treaty Europe will know no peace, 1 " he feared.^
V/ilson answered in the most friendly way, signing himself
"Cordially and sincerely yours , 11

He agreed with Smuts

that the treaty should he just, but he called to mind the
"very great offense against civilization which the G-erman
State committed and the necessity for making it evident
once for all that such things can lead only to the most
severe punishment ,11
On May 22 Smuts again sent identical messages to
the President and the Prime Minister,

This document^-7

was the most detailed prepared by Smuts on his objections
to the treaty.

In it he said:

I think the two cardinal errors in policy of this
Treaty are the long occupation of the Rhine, and
the enlargement of Poland beyond anything which we
had contemplated during the war. These two.errors
are full of menace for the future peace of Europe,
and I urge that every means be taken to remove them
before it is too late.
He criticized the reparation clauses as being unworkable,
but he did not ask that pensions and allowances be removed.,

■**%!illin, op. cit., II, 2l6-17; Hancock, op. cit. ,
p. $22; Tillman, op. cit., p. 3V7 •
■^Hancock, op. cit,, p. $23; Millin, op. cit., II,
217-18; Kraus, op. cit., p. 281.
^ 3 e e R*. S. Laker, op. cit., III, hr$ 8-6$ for the
full text.
l8 I b id . ,

III,

k 6 l.
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He objected also to certain of the military and air clauses
and to the internationalization of Germany’s internal v/aterways.

Furthermore, he thought the treaty was

• • . full of small, comparatively unimportant
provisions which serve no useful purpose, but
must be unnecessarily galling and wounding to
the feelings of a defeated enemy. . . . he should
be careful to eliminate from it all trace of petty
spite and ill-feeling, which cannot serve so great
a cause as ours, nor promote the interests of fu
ture goodwill and peace.^-9
Smuts concluded his letter with a paragraph suggesting a
procedure to be followed in revising the treaty.

As. it

was very important that the ,rtreaty should not be capable
of moral repudiation by the G-erman people hereafter,” the
A.llies should confer with the Germans concerning their
objections.

He recommended that a committee of three minor

delegates be chosen for this conference.

The committee

would report to the Supreme Council, which alone would take
the responsibility for actual changes.

Smuts thought such

a method would remove all taint of dictation from the
treaty and bring the public opinion of the world to accept
it, while at the same time the Supreme Council would avoid
direct negotiations with the Germans.

After all, ”the

final sanction of this great instrument must be the ap
proval of mankind.”^

■^R. s. Baker, op. cit., III, ko 3 - 6 J'r.
2 0 Ibid., III, )l6'l-65.
pp. 5^5-26.

See also Hancock, on. cit.,

107
The Germans submitted their formal observations on
the peace terms to the Conference on May 29*

In this

lengthy document the Germans protested against the occupa
tion clauses; asked that all nations agree to reduce their
armaments to the same extent as Germany was being asked to
do; asked that they be admitted to the League of nations
at once and that they be named the mandatory under the
League for their former colonies; renounced their rights
to Alsace-Lorraine but asked for a plebiscite there; and
protested many of the other territorial settlements, espe
cially the loss of Upper Silesia to Poland*
also made some counter-suggestions•

The Germans

They offered to pay

as reparations something like £>2 5 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 , without
interest, if concessions were made in other parts of the
treaty.

They also asked that a neutral inquiry be made

to determine actual responsibility for the war, as they
refused to accept full blame.

Finally, they contended

that the treaty did not conform to the pre-Armistice
agreements--that It was not a “Wilson peace . ” 21
Smutsfs reaction to the German proposals was em
bodied in a letter written to Wilson on Hay 30.

The Ger

mans were right In their contention that the treaty did
not conform to Wilson’s principles, he said.

Such a

2 1 For. Reis, of U.S., Peace Conference, VI, 795-901.
See also Tillman, op. cit., pp. 3k3-k9; Lloyd George, Peace
Treaties, I, 682-SkT; rV S. Baker, on. cit., Ii, 512-13.
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breach, of faith on the part of the Allies would have very
grave consequences in the future*

He explained:

This v/ar began with a breach of a solemn international
undertaking, and it has been one of our most important
war aims to vindicate international law and the sanc
tity of international engagements* If the Allies end
the war by following the example of Germany at the
beginning, and also confront the world v/ith a "scrap
of paper," the discredit on us will be so great that
I shudder to think of its ultimate effect on public
opinion*
There will be a terrible disillusion if the peoples
come to think that we are not concluding a Wilson
Peace, that we are not keeping our promises to the
world or faith with the public. But If in so doing
we appear a3.so to break the formal agreement deliber
ately entered into (as I think we do), we shall be
overwhelmed with, the gravest discredit, and this Peace
may well become an even greater disaster to the world
than the war w a s . ^
The British Empire delegation held a special meeting
on June 1 and 2 to consider what reply should be given to
the German note.

After a brief summing up by the Prime

Minister of possible concessions to the Germans, the meeting
was turned over to the other delegates.

General Smuts led

off with a very severe criticism of the treaty*

His prin

cipal objections, as In his previous letters, were to the
occupation and reparation clauses, the eastern boundaries
of Germany, and the internationalization of Genian rivers.
He urged that Germany be admitted to the League of Nations
at once, !t1it being essential to carry her with us and re-

22

R. S. Baker, op. °*’
h
Smuts, Jr., op. cit . 3 pp. 211213-20; Hancock, op. cit., p.

ill, L66-63. See also
Millin, op. cit*, II,
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move the possibility of an.oth.er combination through Germany
and Russia joining hands in misfortune.*”

He further said

that n*Poland was an historic failure, and always would be
a failure, and in this Treaty we were trying to reverse the
verdict of history.*n

He thought that a definite sum should

be fixed as Germany*s liability in the matter of reparations.
He suggested the sum of L5,000,000,000, although that was
probably not high enough. ^ 6

He also reiterated his belief

that the treaty constituted a breach of a legal contract
because it was not in accordance with Wilson* s fourteen
points as provided by the pre-Armistice agreement,^
Although there was some support for Smuts*s views
among the other delegates, a very reasonable answer to his
objections was given by Balfour, who thought
General Smuts treated the matter in rather a too
legal a manner. . . . It was only necessary to read
the Fourteen Points to see that they were incapable
of being treated in a strictly legal manner.
It was a wrong attitude to fix the mind on the lam
entations of the Germans, upon their misfortunes,
when in fact the Germans were responsible to the
Y/hole world. . . ♦ Germany was no unhappy victim of
circumstances; she was suffering, and ought to suf
fer, for her crimes; and there was no sign whatever
that Germany v/as repentant. 6
At the conclusion of this meeting the "unanimous11

Lloyd George, Peace Treaties, I, 633-93*
^'Hancock, op. cit., p. 529*
^ L l o y d George, Peace Treaties, I, 695-96, 699*
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decisions or the delegation were embodied in a draft reso
lution for Lloyd GeorgeTs use in bis talks with, the other
members of the Council of Four.

Smuts was incensed at the

use of the word ''unanimous," as the resolution did not
recommend the drastic changes he desired.

He wrote to

Lloyd George protesting the resolution and demanding that
the treaty be entirely recast.

11 fWe are endeavouring, 1 "

he wrote, 11 Tto make a Peace of the twentieth century which
might have been in place in the seventeenth or eighteenth,
but which is entirely opposed to the spirit of the times,
and may well prove disastrous from every point of view . 1
As much as Lloyd George admired Smuts, he was
above all a practical politician who knew that expediency
often had to take precedence over idealism.

Furthermore,

he alone of the Big Four had honestly been willing to
make concessions to the Germans and had been trying to
persuade his colleagues to revise the treaty . ^

Smutsfs

lofty pronouncements from his position of lesser respon
sibility goaded the fiery Welshman into replying with what
was very nearly a taunt:
:,Are you prepared to forgo the claims for pensions
and so confine compensation to material damage?
The Germans repeatedly request the return of the
26

_

llillin, op. cit., ll, 222. See also Hancock,
0 0 . cit., pp. 530-31*
27
'Tillman, on, cit;., o. 3t-'-3; Seyrioun, on. cit.,
IV, !j.73-7U
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colonies. Are you prepared to allow C-eraan SouthWest Arnica and German East Africa to be returned
to Germany as a concession which, might induce them
to sign the peace? "2 <->
In answer to the questions ashed by tho Prime I.Iinister
Smuts wrote:
"With regard to reparation, I consider the sum.
of five thousand million mentioned both by us and
the Germans as reasonable though high. . . . 7/e
should . . . apportion a lump sum, say two thousand
million, to restoration, and leave the rest as the
amount divisible among the Allies In respect of
the other claims, such as pensions. . , .
"With regard to the German colonies, I do not
for a moment contemplate their return to Germany
as one of the concessions we should make. No doubt
in future, when a new atmosphere has grown up, the
German claims to colonial mandates will come to be
viewed in a different light and that contingency
has to be kept In view in whatever arrangements we
make now. But please do not have the impression
that I would be generous at the expense of others,
so long as the Union gets South-7/est Africa. In
this great business South-West Africa is as dust
compared to the burdens now hanging over the civi
lized world. . . .
"When you are up against a position so terrible
In Its possibilities for good and evil, you can only
do one thing, . . . the thing you can justify to
your conscience and that of all other reasonable
fair-minded people. This Treaty breathes a poison
ous spirit of revenge, which may yet scorch the
fair face— not of a corner of Europe, but of
Europe."^9
In spite of the vigorous campaign carried on by
Smuts and other liberal-minded delegates, the last minute
revisions In the treaty were of slight importance.

The

decision to hold a plebiscite In Upper Silesia, instead of

^0 I.iIllin, on. cit., II, 225-26.
2U b i a . , II, 226-23.
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giving the territory to Poland outright, was the most im
portant, 30
Smuts was so dissatisfied with the treaty that he
decided, sometime in Hay, not to sign it.^*

Although he

shared Smuts1s misgivings about the treaty, Botha, as
Prime Minister, had to sign in order to bring South Africa
into the League of Nations and into the position of being
recognized as an equal to all other nations in the world.
The two life-long friends, reluctant to part company over
so vital an issue, brought their problem to Lloyd George,
who advised Smuts to sign under protest and to criticize
the treaty as much as he liked afterwards.

This advice

Smuts decided to follow.
The brief ceremony of the final signing of the
German treaty was held in the Hall of Mirrors of the
Palace of Versailles on June 28, 1919*-^

Smuts signed

but published a vigorous protest the same day.

His state

ment looked not so much to the past as to the future:
rlThe real work of making peace will only begin
after this Treaty has been signed. . . .
"The spirit of the new life, the victory of

^Seymour,

op. c i t .,

jlV

, 1l73.

-^Ibid., IV, k66; Hancock, op. cit., p . 535
-^Crafford, op. cit., p. 1&6 22 ; Mraus, op. cit.,
p. 282; Millin, op. cit., II, 252-55
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the great human ideals, for which the people have
shed their blood and their treasure without stint,
the fulfillment of their aspirations towards a new
international order, and a fairer, better world,
are not written in this Treaty, and will not be
written in treaties.
’Not in this Mountain, nor
in Jerusalem, but in spirit and in truth , 1 as the
Great Master said, must the foundations of the new
order be laid. A new heart must be given, not only
to our enemies, but also to us— a contrite spirit
for the woes which have overwhelmed the world: a
spirit of pity, mercy and forgiveness for the sins
and wrongs which we have suffered. A new spirit
of generosity and humanity, born in the hearts of
the people in this great hour of common suffering
and sorrow, can alone heal the wounds which have
been inflicted on the body of Christendom.
11And this new spirit among the people will be
the solvent for the problems which the statesmen
have found too hard at the conference. There are
territorial settlements which will need revision.
There are guarantees laid down which we all hope
will soon be found out of harmony with the new
peaceful temper and unarmed state of our former
enemies. There are punishments foreshadowed over
most of which a calmer mood may yet prefer to pass
the sponge of oblivion. There are indemnities
stipulated, which cannot be enacted without grave
injury to the industrial revival of Europe, and
which it will be in the interests of all to render
more tolerable and moderate. There are numerous
pinpricks which will cease to pain under the heal
ing influence of the new international atmosphere.
The real peace of the peoples ought to follow,
complete, and amend the peace of the statesmen.
!IIn this Treaty, however, two achievements of
far reaching importance for the world are definitely
recorded. The one is the destruction of Prussian
militarism; the other the institution of the League
of Nations. I am confident that the League of Na
tions will yet prove the path of escape for Europe
out of the ruin brought by this war. But the League
is as yet only a form. . . • The new creative spirit
which is once more moving among the peoples in their
anguish must fill the institution with life and with
inspiration for the pacific ideals born of this war,
and so convert it into a real instrument of progress.
In that way the abolition of militarism, in this
treaty unfortunately confined to the enemy, may soon
come as a blessing and relief to the Allied peoples
as well. And the enemy peoples should at the earliest

possible date join the League and, in collaboration
with, the Allied peoples, learn to practice the great
lesson of this war, that not in separate ambition,
or in selfish domination, but in common service for
the great human causes, lies the true path of na
tional progress. This joint collaboration is espe
cially necessary to-day for the reconstruction of
a ruined and broken world . 11
After more in the same vein, the protest ended with an
appeal to the Germans to make an honest effort to live

up

to their obligations under the treaty and to the Allies to
use their God-given victory not for selfish ends but for
the furtherance of great human ideals.
One of Smuts*s biographers said:
No formal declaration of protest in human memory
has been more significant than was the Smuts document. Its chief value lay in the hope, the glowing
promise with which, despite the Treaty, it furnished
mankind.35
Another writer, however, speaking not of this protest alone
but of Smuts*s continued denunciation of the Treaty of Ver
sailles through the years, said:
Indeed, his very blunder /his protest of June 28,
19127 catapulted him to world fame. The great mor
alist, the purest of the pure was for the Germans 1
For years his hard-hitting phrases of condemnation
of Versailles were quoted by the Germans, whose
chief witness he was to remain for many years. For
years the appeasers and the defeatists claimed Smuts
as their man, although he was, despite his one grave
error, the very opposite of the yellow crowd. . . .

op. cit. . II, 255-53. See also H. S.
Baker, op. cit., II-, 520; Smuts, Jr., op. cit., pp. 213-l^G
7/Illiam MacDonald, "General Smuts on the Peace," The Nation,
CIX (July 5, 1919), 10-11.
Crafford, op. cit., p. 163 .
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Throughout the ensuing ups and downs of his
political fortunes, Smuts 1 moral authority grew.
His^shadow loomed large over the globe, which his
vision embraced as a whole. The testimony of such
a man was worth more to Germany than the secretly
built Luftwaffe.3°
The same writer also said:
He was wrong, entirely and definitely wrong, in
taking Germany to his heart. He believed In that
fallacious difference between Prussian militarism
and the German people that for twenty years confused
the minds of world democracy, and he was foremost
in creating that perverted guilt-complex, prevailing,
above all, among English-speaking peoples, that made
the victors of Versailles throw away their bitterly
won supremacy, and allowed a charlatan to plunge the
world Into the gravest catastrophe of all time. If
Versailles erred, it erred on the side of leniency.37
Although the protest of June 28 was Smuts1s last
pronouncement as a Peace Conference delegate, his farewell
message upon leaving England for South Africa in July be
longs to Peace Conference history.

He spoke of other

matters, such as Russia, the British dominions, and the
Irish problem, but the treaty was also in his thoughts.
The treaty, he said,

should be accepted as a fact; mankind

should look to the future in hope.

All bitterness to

Germany should be forgotten and all. shoLild work together
for the good of Europe and the world.

He continued:

You cannot have a stable Europe without a stable,

3^Kraus, op. cit., pp. 2 8 2 -8 3 37ibid., p. 2 6 9 . rrIt should always be remem
bered that the principal beneficiary of the phrase Tthe
errors of Versailles 1 has been Hitler and Germany.1'
IvIcCallum, op. cit. , p. vii.
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settled Germany, and you cannot have a stable,
settled, prosperous Great Britain while Europe is
weltering in confusion and unsettlement next door.
• . . I see salvation for us and the v^orld only in
a more human spirit and outlook all around. . . .
Let us move forward with courage and in faith and
let us not fall back into the hopeless enmities,
the sterile and blasting bitterness of the p a s t . 3 &
Smuts indirectly influenced the subsequent history
of the treaty in another way.

John Maynard Keynes, the

chief representative of the British Treasury in Paris and
an admirer of Smuts, was so sure the treaty was all wrong
that he resigned his post and left Paris in June before
the treaty was signed.

Soon afterwards he wrote Smuts,

asking the older nan1s advice as to what he could do about
the treaty.

Smuts answered at once:

” 1 think it would be very advisable for you as soon
as possible to set about writing a clear connected
account of what the financial and economic clauses
of the Treaty actually are and mean, and what their
probable results will be. It should not be too long
or technical, as we may want to appeal to the plain
man more than to the well informed or the specialist. 11

Keynes took up the suggestion with alacrity and the result
was, of course, The Economic Consequences of the Peace.
The book was an immediate sensation in both Britain and
the United States.

Keynes proved to be not only a brilliant

polemicist but also a master of sarcasm.

His caricature

11General Smuts:
Statesman," Hew Republic, XX
(September 17, 1919), 200-202. See also Millin, op. cit.,
II, 270-72; Hancock, op. cit. , p. $1^7*

^Millin,

op. cit., IX, 237-33.
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of Wilson became so well known that even today it is often
the accepted picture of Wilson at the Peace Conference.
Keynes portrayed Wilson as a dull-witted, strait-laced
Puritan who Was "bamboozled" by Lloyd George and Clemenceau
into giving up his ideals for a peace of the old world
type*^*0

Keynes' s book was used In the United States Sen

ate to help defeat the Versailles Treaty, which included
the League of Nations.^1

Y/ithout the cooperation of the

United States neither the treaty nor the League had a chance
of success.

Thus, Ironically, Smuts's influence on his

friend helped bring about the crippling of the League and
the very state of affairs in Europe which Smuts had pre
dicted would be the result of the treaty.^

^Keynes, op. cit., pp.
^Llewellyn Woodward, "A British View of Mr. Wil
son 1 s Foreign Policy," Wilson's Foreign Policy in Perspec
tive , ed. Edward H. Buehrig (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana
University Press, 1957), pp. lij-1-51.
^McCallum, op. cit. , pp. 3
9
Uillin, on. cit.,
II, 239; Crafford, op. cit., pp. 152-53.

CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSIONS
Jan Christian Smuts exerted an influence at the
Paris Peace Conference of 1919 out of all proportion to
liis official position as a member of the delegation from
the Union of South Africa.

His influence on the Treaty

of Versailles can be read with certainty in the League of
Nations Covenant and in the reparations settlement.
Smuts*s work on the League of Nations Covenant
has rightly earned almost universal praise.

It has been

said that "Wilson, whose great reputation Is deservedly
based on his vision and sponsorship of the League of
Nations, owes much in this regard to the political con
cepts and acumen of his friend Smuts.11-^ Both Wilson and
Smuts were Idealists, devoted to the idea of an inter
national organization for peace.

Partly because of the

close affinity between these two men, Smuts was able to
play the prominent role that he did in the creation of the
League of Nations.

A more important reason for his influ

ence, however, was the fact that he brought to Paris a
more complete and more practical plan for an International
organisation than did any other delegate*

The excellence

of Smuts *s plan assured him a seat on the League of Nation

*^Curry, op. c i t . , p. 9^6.
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Commission at the Conference, and many of the ideas ex
pressed in his plan found a place in the League of Nations
Covenant as finally drafted and accepted.
The system of mandates established under the League
of Nations was also influenced by Smuts.

Here it was the

realistic rather than the id.ealistic side of Smuts’s char
acter which prevailed.

Smuts, the practical man of affairs,

was able to produce a compromise solution to the problem
of the German colonies that we.s accepted as being in har
mony with both the Ideals of Wilson and the annexationist
schemes of some of the other delegates.

Smuts’s role in

the mandates controversy has not always been commended,
but, undei* the circumstances, It is hard to conceive what
better solution could have been found, than the one Smuts
suggested.

The system worked, on the whole, rather well

and was less severely criticized during the years ahead
than at the Conference itself.
Smuts rs role in the reparations settlement has
frequently been assailed by his critics, but It too can
be defended.

The single act of Smuts with regard to

reparations was his writing of the memorandum on pensions
and allowances,^ which seems to have been the deciding
factor in Wilson’s decision to include pensions in repara
tions.

Here again it was the similarity In the Idealism

2

See above, pp. 7§-80.
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of the two which caused Wilson to accept Smuts’s opinion
in a field far removed from the realm of ideals and the
matter of International organization.

It should be em

phasized that Smuts believed, when he wrote his memorandum,
that a fixed sum for reparations would be stated in the
treaty and that his suggestions would influence only the
distribution of such a fixed amount.

Smuts*s mistake was

that of allowing himself to be drawn into the reparations
controversy at all, as it was not an area \7ith which he was
thoroughly familiar.

Pensions would probably have been

included without Smuts*s intervention, and he could have
avoided much calumny in the future by refusing to become
involved in the matter.

It was not, however, Smuts *s na

ture to sidestep an issue out of mere self-interest.
Smuts’s mission to Hungary accomplished little of
a positive nature.

Nevertheless, the fact that he was

selected to represent the Conference on a delicate diplo
matic errand showed the respect and confidence he enjoyed
among the other delegates.
Smuts attracted more attention at Paris by his
campaign to have the German treaty revised than by any of
his other actions.

His efforts to create a just but

merciful peace were completely sincere.

It must be remem

bered, however, that he was not one of the Big Four and
did not have the same degree of responsibility for deci
sions as did Wilson, Clemenceau, and Lloyd (George.

It is

121

doubtful whether he could have made a better treaty if he
had been a member of the Supreme Council.

There were, in

1919 9 too many conflicting claims to be resolved and far
too many recent and deep wounds to be healed.
Although many writers have criticized the treaty
with (Germany, others have contended that it was the best
treaty that could have been written under the circumstances.
It contained provisions for revision, under the League of
Nations, although such revision was little used by the
statesmen of the next two decades.

Smuts deserves nothing

but praise for following the d.Ictates of his conscience
during the period when the treaty was under discussion.
Once the treaty was finally drafted and signed, however,
the situation was entirely different.

Smuts then might

have served, humanity better had he used his grea.t moral
influence to uphold the Versailles settlement rather than
to attack it.

This latter action helped establish the

guilt-complex, widely held by the English-speaking peoples
In the post-war years, and did much to create the atmos
phere which Hitler used to such advantage In his rise to
power during the decade of the thirties.

Had the Allies

maintained a solid front in peace as they had In war, the
treaty might have been better enforced and, as hoped by
many In 1919* gradually revised*

Reparations might have

been scaled down and other harsh features of the treaty
eliminated or softened.

At the sane tine, Germany would
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have been prevented from capitalizing on the disunity and
defeatism of the former Allies.
These conclusions, of course, go beyond Smuts’s
work at Paris in 1919*

There he shov/ed himself a wise,

honest, sincere, practical negotiator.

The most important

outcome of the Conference may well have been the League of
Nations.

For his v/ork on the Covenant, above all else that

he accomplished at Paris in 1919* ^an Christian Smuts de
serves to be remembered and revered.
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